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The Preempting of Equal Protection for
Immigrants?
Jenny-Brooke Condon *
Abstract
Recent
debates
about
immigration
have
focused
overwhelmingly on unauthorized migration and the respective
roles of the federal and state governments in enforcing
immigration law. But that emphasis in law and theory has
obscured a critical civil rights question of our time: what measure
of equality is due to those with the opportunity to abide by the
rules of entry, who are now lawfully present within the United
States?
Although the United States Supreme Court recognized
decades ago that lawfully present migrants are a discrete and
insular minority entitled to heightened judicial protection under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, in
recent years, a body of little-analyzed federal and state court
decisions has eroded that longstanding precedent, elevating
deference to the federal government’s power to set immigration
policy over a previously established constitutional commitment to
immigrants’ equal treatment by the states. This Article critically
explores this development and argues that although federalism
may legitimately serve as a lens through which to gauge arbitrary
discrimination, federalism principles should not stealthily serve
as a preemption-like doctrine beneath the surface in equal
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protection cases. To reign in federalism’s potentially disruptive
impact on immigrants’ rights, this Article argues that courts
should consider federalism principles only as an interpretative
tool in equal protection cases involving migrants and recommit to
immigrants’ long settled right to equal treatment by the states.
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I. Introduction
For most migrants, the path of legal entry into the United
States represents a golden door of opportunity. 1 But legal entry
does not guarantee equal treatment. Louisiana, for example, bars
lawfully present migrants with valid visas from taking the bar
exam 2 and excludes lawfully present noncitizens classified as
non-immigrants 3 from working as licensed nurses. 4 In Tennessee,
certain lawfully present migrants are ineligible for drivers’
licenses. 5 Meanwhile, Connecticut, Colorado, Maine, and
Washington, among other states, deny lawful permanent
residents equivalent state-funded healthcare benefits provided to
citizens. 6 Courts have sanctioned this dissimilar treatment in the
face of equal protection challenges, in spite of the United States
1. See ROGER DANIELS, GUARDING THE GOLDEN DOOR: AMERICAN
IMMIGRATION POLICY AND IMMIGRANTS SINCE 1882, at 3 (2004) (describing the
“golden doorway of admission to the United States” and various efforts to
narrow it).
2. See LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 410–21 (5th Cir. 2005) (denying an
equal protection challenge to a Louisiana Supreme Court rule that restricted
bar admission to citizens and lawful permanent residents).
3. Under immigration law, nonimmigrants are persons “admitted to the
United States only for the duration of their status, and on the express condition
they have ‘no intention of abandoning’ their countries of origin and do not intend
to seek permanent residence in the United States.” Id. at 418–19. But, while
“nonimmigrants must indicate an intent not to remain permanently in the
United States” as a condition of their visa, they may lawfully express a
simultaneous “intent to remain permanently (when they apply for LPR status).”
Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66, 77–78 (2d. Cir. 2012) (describing this dual
intent doctrine).
4. See Van Staden v. St. Martin, 664 F.3d 56, 57–61 (5th Cir. 2011)
(rejecting an equal protection challenge to Louisiana law that restricted nursing
licenses to citizens and lawful permanent residents).
5. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 535
(2007) (upholding a Tennessee law excluding lawfully present migrants with
temporary status from obtaining drivers’ licenses). A number of states, however,
have recently expanded access to drivers’ licenses to migrants regardless of their
immigration status. See State Laws Providing Access to Driver’s Licenses or
Cards, Regardless of Immigration Status, NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR. (Mar. 2016),
https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/drivers-license-access-table.pdf
(last visited Mar. 23, 2016) (summarizing states’ laws that permit drivers
licenses to be obtained by immigrants) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
6. See infra Part III (discussing the cases that examined this issue).
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Supreme Court’s holding more than forty years ago in Graham v.
Richardson 7 that migrants who are lawfully present in the
United States are a discrete and insular minority entitled to
heightened judicial protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.
For the migrants recently denied an equal share of their state’s
resources and economic opportunities, the Fourteenth
Amendment’s guarantee of equal treatment has proven hollow;
the courts that have upheld laws imposing unequal burdens on
lawfully present migrants have done so under deferential rational
basis scrutiny. 8
This disconnect between Graham’s promise of equality and
the discrimination experienced by lawfully present noncitizens
has escaped the critical analysis it deserves. In recent years, both
the United States Supreme Court’s jurisprudence addressed to
immigrants’ treatment by the states 9 and an extensive scholarly
literature have focused heavily on immigration federalism; that
is, the extent to which the states and federal government share
power
to
regulate
migrants
in
ways
traditionally
unacknowledged. 10 This emphasis in law and theory on the
structural relationship between federal and state power to
regulate immigrants has overshadowed an essential dialogue
regarding immigrants’ rights. 11 More specifically, it has obscured
7. 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971).
8. See, e.g., LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 420 (5th Cir. 2005) (“[R]ational
basis review must be the appropriate standard for evaluating state law
classifications affecting nonimmigrant aliens.”); Soskin v. Reinertson, 353 F.3d
1242, 1255 (10th Cir. 2004) (upholding Colorado’s alienage-based denial of
healthcare benefits to lawful permanent residents under a deferential rational
basis scrutiny).
9. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2497 (2012) (examining
whether federal law preempted an Arizona statute); Chamber of Commerce v.
Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 593–94 (2011) (same).
10. See generally Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in
Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567 (2008); Kerry Abrams, Plenary
Power Preemption, 99 VA. L. REV. 601 (2013); Stella Burch Elias, The New
Immigration Federalism, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 703 (2013); Jennifer M. Chacón, The
Transformation of Immigration Federalism, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 577
(2012); Adam B. Cox, Immigration Law’s Organizing Principles, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. 341 (2008); Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of
Immigration Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 787, 796 (2008).
11. See Huntington, supra note 10, at 838 (acknowledging that “[a] focus on
federalism in the immigration context should not displace concern for individual
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the fact that for lawfully present migrants, a group formally
entitled to protection as a suspect class 12 and long assumed to
enjoy community membership similar to citizens, class-based
discrimination persists with the sanction of deferential courts. In
recent years, a body of little-analyzed federal and state court
precedent has eroded Graham, elevating deference to the federal
government’s power to set immigration policy over a previously
established constitutional commitment to immigrants’ equal
treatment by the states. 13
This Article critiques this development, which if left
unchanged, will effectively preempt equal protection for
immigrants. 14 It argues for fulfillment of Graham’s essential
rights” and that the difficult and important question regarding the status of
judicial review when states regulate immigrants requires “greater debate and
exploration”). Other scholars have critiqued the dwindling focus in law and
theory on immigrant rights. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and Civil
Rights: State and Local Efforts to Regulate Immigration, 46 GA. L. REV. 609,
611–12 (2012) (“Despite the fact that immigration and immigration enforcement
directly and indirectly raise civil rights concerns, the legal analysis and the
public discourse often ignores, or at least obscures, the direct civil rights
impacts of U.S. immigration law and its enforcement.”); Geoffrey Heeren,
Persons Who Are Not the People: The Changing Rights of Immigrants in the
United States, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 367, 369–70 (2013) (discussing
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012), and noting that in earlier eras,
the Supreme Court “might have concerned itself more closely with the questions
of individual rights” raised by challengers and critics of the law than “structural
questions”); Raquel Aldana, On Rights, Federal Citizenship, and the “Alien,” 46
WASHBURN L.J. 263, 290 (2007) (“[I]mmigrant advocates must grapple with an
increasingly limited number of viable legal strategies to challenge anti-alienage
measures in the courts.”).
12. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971) (applying strict
scrutiny and overturning state laws that denied lawfully present migrants
public benefits).
13. See infra Part III (examining this body of cases in detail).
14. Only a few commentators have challenged congressional power to
sanction state discrimination on the basis of alienage status, and they have done
so with varied depths of treatment. See, e.g., Lucas Guttentag, The Forgotten
Equality Norm in Immigration Preemption: Discrimination, Harassment, and
the Civil Rights Act of 1870, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 45 (2013)
(arguing that the Civil Rights Act of 1870’s policy of ensuring immigrants’
equality should be given effect in any immigration preemption analysis, but
noting that, in contrast, “[f]ederal disfavor or disability does not authorize state
discrimination”). In a critique of provisions of the Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) that “permitted federal and state governments to
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mandate that states treat lawfully present immigrants equally,
irrespective of the vagaries of federal immigration policy. In
taking aim at the recent rise of federalism concerns in equal
protection doctrine involving alienage status, 15 this Article
ultimately seeks to answer a broader normative question that
both the Supreme Court and commentators alike, both before and
after Graham, have never resolved: What role, if any, should
federalism—specifically, the supremacy of federal immigration
policy—play in determining states’ equal protection obligations to
lawfully present noncitizens?

exclude certain aliens from welfare and other benefits,” Gilbert Paul Carrasco
argued that Congress could not immunize the states from the requirements of
equal protection, which he described as “inverse preemption.” See Gilbert Paul
Carrasco, Congressional Arrogation of Power: Alien Constellation in the Galaxy
of Equal Protection, 74 B.U. L. REV. 591, 617–18 (1994) (“[T]he primacy granted
federal statutes by the Supremacy Clause, while authorizing Congress to occupy
a field and preclude state legislation on specific subjects, does not permit the
licensing of state action that violates the Constitution.”). Not long after its
enactment, Michael Wishnie examined the 1996 Welfare Reform Act—which,
similar to IRCA, sanctions states’ alienage-based denials of public benefits.
Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration
Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 497–98 (2001)
(analyzing the Act through the lens of whether Congress has the power to
delegate its immigration lawmaking authority to the states); see also infra Part
I.B (critically discussing Wishnie’s argument). Some might suggest that this
Article’s description of federalism’s role as “preempting equal protection” is a
poor fit because, unlike preemption, the influence of congressional policy on
equal protection doctrine in the cases described would sanction state measures,
not invalidate them. But this Article’s description aims to instead capture the
ways in which the supremacy of federal law, just like in traditional preemption,
nullifies another source of law, here: equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
15. This Article’s critique concerns the equal protection rights of lawfully
present migrants, who under Supreme Court precedent are entitled to
protection as a suspect class. It does not make additional claims regarding the
rights of undocumented migrants. The United States Supreme Court in Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) held that undocumented migrants are not a suspect
class entitled to the same equal protection scrutiny or solicitude as lawful
immigrants, even as it then went on to strike down Texas’s exclusion of
undocumented children from a free public education under an intermediate
scrutiny. The normative question of whether a state’s equal protection
obligations ought to be modulated when a regulation affects undocumented
immigrants is beyond the scope of this Article.
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The answer matters, for it will determine the extent to which
equality under the Constitution is contingent upon congressional
policy, and invariably majoritarian politics. For migrants, who
are categorically excluded from the political process, much is at
stake: employment and professional opportunities, healthcare
benefits, drivers’ licenses, and a sense of membership and
belonging in their communities. 16
To be sure, federalism has long figured importantly in equal
protection doctrine involving immigrants. 17 In fact, the Supreme
Court has reinforced the principle that the federal government
has exclusive responsibility for the regulation of immigration, as
much through its equal protection jurisprudence as it has
through preemption decisions. 18 The Court presumes that the
federal government acts reasonably when it draws distinctions
between noncitizens and citizens because of the federal
government’s plenary authority over immigration matters
grounded in its exclusive foreign affairs power. 19 Conversely,
states lack authority to regulate immigration, and the Court has
closely scrutinized state laws to smoke out improper motives for
alienage-based distinctions in order to ensure equal treatment. 20
16. See infra Part IV (examining the body of state and federal court
decisions addressing these issues).
17. See infra Part III (examining the role of federalism in Supreme Court’s
alienage jurisprudence).
18. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 84–85 (1976) (distinguishing
Graham’s equal protection analysis for state laws from federal ones, noting that
“it is the business of the political branches of the Federal Government, rather
than that of either the States or the Federal Judiciary, to regulate the
conditions of entry and residence of aliens”); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225
(1982) (reasoning that “[t]he States enjoy no power with respect to the
classification of aliens. This power is committed to the political branches of the
Federal Government.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted));
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948) (striking down a
California law that restricted fishing licenses to noncitizens as a violation of
equal protection after an extended discussion of exclusive federal authority to
regulate immigrants and the conditions of their entry).
19. See Mathews, 426 U.S. at 85 (“[A] division by a State of the category of
persons who are not citizens of that State into subcategories of United States
citizens and aliens has no apparent justification, whereas, a comparable
classification by the Federal Government is a routine and normally legitimate
part of its business.”).
20. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971); see also Plyler, 457
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Although this interplay between federalism and equality has
long existed in the equal protection jurisprudence involving
immigrants, in the recent cases critiqued in this Article, federal
immigration policy has played a more disruptive role,
transforming equal protection doctrine involving state alienage
classifications into a preemption-like inquiry that privileges
congressional policy choices. 21 The preempting of equal protection
in this context also alters the form of constitutional review. That
is, in many of the recent cases upholding state alienage
classifications, courts have incorporated legal considerations into
their equal protection analysis that are more readily associated
with preemption doctrine.
For example, courts assessing equal protection challenges by
immigrants have considered whether state restrictions mirror
federal objectives, correspond to an identifiable congressional
policy, and operate “harmoniously within the federal program.” 22
U.S. at 216 n.14 (explaining the “treatment of certain classifications as suspect”
and noting that “[s]ome classifications are more likely than others to reflect
deep-seated prejudice rather than legislative rationality in pursuit of some
legitimate objective”).
21. Some have argued, however, that the Court’s earlier equal protection
decisions in this area were, in fact, preemption cases masquerading as equal
protection decisions. See Michael J. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A
Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1060–65 (1979)
(“Conceptualizing
constitutional
doctrine
regarding
alienage-based
classifications in terms of the supremacy rather than the equal protection clause
explains . . . the Court’s differential treatment of state and federal lines drawn
on the basis of alienage, which would otherwise be an anomaly in equal
protection doctrine.”); David F. Levi, Note, The Equal Treatment of Aliens:
Preemption or Equal Protection? 31 STAN. L. REV. 1069, 1070 (1979) (arguing
that the Court’s decisions involving alienage classifications in the 1970s
followed “an unarticulated theory of preemption,” premised upon the notion that
the states may not interfere with federal regulation of immigrants by altering,
for those whom the federal government has admitted, “the terms of immigration
with new burdens”). In Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 11 n.16 (1982), a case
challenging a state-alienage classification, the Court noted this commentary,
sidestepped the equal protection question altogether, and decided the case on
the basis of preemption.
22. See, e.g., Guaman v. Velez, 421 N.J. Super. 239, 266–67 (App. Div.
2011) (denying a preliminary injunction in equal protection challenge to
alienage-based denial of state-funded healthcare benefits, reasoning, in part,
that the law “mirrors federal objectives, corresponds to an identifiable
congressional policy, and operates harmoniously within the federal program”
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These considerations naturally shift the focus of equal protection
inquiry from the justification for states’ discrimination, to
whether Congress objects or is supportive of the states’
treatment. 23
Further, by eschewing the heightened judicial skepticism
mandated by Graham and its progeny in state alienage cases,
and, in its place, reviewing discriminatory laws with a deference
formerly reserved for the federal government’s immigration
regulations, courts are collapsing what has long existed as a
dichotomous equal protection framework in cases involving
alienage status. 24 Unlike other areas of equal protection scrutiny
where the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments have been deemed
coextensive, since 1975, federal and state laws that classify on
the basis of alienage status have been treated differently for
equal protection purposes. 25 Federal laws receive deferential
rational basis review because of the federal government’s plenary
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted)), aff’d, 221 N.J. 213 (2015) (per
curiam); Cid v. S.D. Dep’t of Social Servs., 598 N.W.2d 887, 892 (S.D. 1999)
(resolving an equal protection claim by reasoning that South Dakota had not
“adopted any rule or legislation that is in conflict with national policies
regarding alienage, or that places any burdens, other than those contemplated
in the federal law, on those subject to its provisions”).
23. This recent emphasis on federalism over rights may be emblematic of
broader tendency in immigration law and discourse. As Kevin Johnson has
observed, immigration debates are “often couched in . . . federalism-styled
arguments,” obscuring that “the core of the public debate over immigration
enforcement concerns the rights of people and how they will be treated by
government.” Johnson, supra note 11, at 638.
24. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 86–87 (1976) (“[T]he Fourteenth
Amendment’s limits on state powers are substantially different from the
constitutional provisions applicable to the federal power over immigration and
naturalization.”); see also Rodriguez v. United States, 169 F.3d 1342, 1347 (11th
Cir. 1999) (noting a different “relationship between aliens and the States rather
than between aliens and the Federal Government”); City of Chi. v. Shalala, 189
F.3d 598, 605 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he deference owed to Congress in matters of
aliens’ status within its borders does not apply to state classification of aliens”),
cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1036 (2000).
25. See Brian Soucek, The Return of Noncongruent Equal Protection, 83
FORDHAM L. REV. 155, 158 (2014) (noting that in spite of the settled principle of
congruence requiring that equal protection be interpreted the same way when
applied to federal and state action, alienage discrimination is “one bastion”
where “noncongruence still remains, sometimes unnoticed, within equal
protection doctrine”).
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authority over immigration matters, 26 while courts have
traditionally treated state laws employing the same or similar
distinctions as suspect classifications that must meet the
demands of strict scrutiny. 27
But recently, this non-congruence is disappearing from equal
protection doctrine in the realm of immigrants’ rights as courts
synchronize their analysis of federal and state alienage
classifications—a largely under-theorized development. 28 Last
year, divided panels of the First and the Ninth Circuits 29 followed
26. Mathews, 426 U.S. at 86–87.
27. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 367 (1971).
28. Indeed, recent accounts of equal protection doctrine involving
immigrants assume an ongoing—and some argue incoherent—non-congruence.
See Soucek, supra note 25, at 159 (arguing that not only has the Court applied
more heightened scrutiny to state cases than federal cases, but also that the
nature of that scrutiny has varied); Cox, supra note 10, at 352 (arguing that
“[c]ourts have struggled for decades to develop a coherent approach to
evaluating alienage rules” and have “for the most part . . . failed: in some cases
courts have suggested that alienage classifications are suspect and trigger
heightened scrutiny, but in other cases courts have suggested that some
alienage restrictions are due great judicial deference”). Clare Huntington has
noted that growing recognition of “immigration federalism”—that is, acceptance
of some measure of shared power between federal and state governments with
respect to the regulation of immigrants—likely means an end to non-congruent
equal protection in the immigration context, but acknowledges that what that
means for individual rights has not yet been explored. See Huntington, supra
note 10, at 838 (“The sharing of immigration authority among levels of
government arguably calls for the unification of this standard, although it is not
necessarily clear what such unification would look like.”). Earlier scholarship
argued that the congruence principle in equal protection doctrine established in
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) warrants strict
scrutiny of “federal alienage classifications in the same manner as state
classifications in the realm of alienage law and fundamental rights.” Victor C.
Romero, The Congruence Principle Applied: Rethinking Equal Protection Review
of Federal Alienage Classifications After Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 76
OR. L. REV. 425, 452 (1997). But this scholarship never contemplated what is
currently occurring in the doctrine: a collapsing of the different tiers of scrutiny
toward a relaxed and unified standard for both federal and state alienage
classifications. Id.
29. See Bruns v. Mayhew, 750 F.3d 61, 70 (1st Cir. 2014) (“[W]e therefore
conclude that if Maine can be said to have ‘discriminated’ at all, it only did so on
the basis of federal Medicaid eligibility, a benign classification subject to mere
rational basis review.”); Korab v. Fink, 748 F.3d 875, 887 (9th Cir. 2014)
(finding rational basis review applies when the state was “merely following the
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a 2004 decision by the Tenth Circuit 30 and upheld state denials of
public benefits to noncitizens after applying rational basis review.
The state courts are split: some have followed the federal courts
or adopted similar approaches, 31 while others have adhered to
Graham and struck down denials of public benefits to immigrants
as violations of equal protection after applying strict scrutiny. 32
In addressing this developing, though not inevitable, collapse
of the dichotomized approach to equal protection involving state
and federal legislation classifying on the basis of alienage status,
this Article seeks to clarify the appropriate role that federalism
should play in equal protection doctrine 33—as an interpretive tool
to
gauge
presumptively
acceptable
justifications
for
distinguishing on the basis of migrants’ immigration status or as
a lens through which to identify arbitrary governmental
discrimination, but not as a preemption-like doctrine that makes
the validity of state laws contingent upon congressional policy
choices. 34
Part II establishes Graham’s theory of equality for
immigrants and its disconnect with the recent lower court
developments. Part III theorizes the ways in which federalism
concerns might matter to states’ equal protection obligations to
lawfully present immigrants and examines the influence of these
various accounts on the Supreme Court’s equal protection
jurisprudence. Here, the Article shows that in contrast to the
recent trend, in previous periods, the Supreme Court emphasized
the structural concerns of federalism to reinforce, rather than
constrict, immigrants’ rights to equal treatment by the states.
Part IV describes the recent erosion of the divergent standards
applicable to federal and state cases involving immigration
federal direction set forth by Congress under the Welfare Reform Act”).
30. Soskin v. Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. 2004).
31. Hong Pham v. Starkowski, 16 A.3d 635, 661 (Conn. 2011); Guaman v.
Velez, 74 A.3d 931, 951 (N.J. App. Div. 2013), aff’d, 221 N.J. 213 (2015) (per
curiam).
32. Finch v. Commonwealth Health Ins. Connector Auth. (Finch I), 946
N.E.2d 1262, 1280 (Mass. 2011); Finch v. Commonwealth Health Ins. Connector
Auth. (Finch II), 959 N.E.2d 970, 973 (Mass. 2012); Aliessa v. Novello, 754
N.E.2d 1085, 1096–98 (N.Y. 2001); Ehrlich v. Perez, 908 A.2d 1220 (Md. 2006).
33. See infra Part V.B. (proposing this approach in detail).
34. Id.
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status, the role of federalism in this development, and the effect:
the supplanting of norms protective of individual rights with
those focused on constitutional structure. Part V identifies
federalism’s place in equal protection analysis involving
migrants, defines its potentially disruptive impact, and offers a
prescription.
II. The Disconnect: A Suspect Classification with Deference
A. Graham’s Theory of Equality
In Graham v. Richardson, the Supreme Court declared for
the first time that alienage is a suspect classification, such that
state laws distinguishing between lawfully present migrants and
citizens are presumptively discriminatory and must meet the
requirements of strict scrutiny. 35 The case involved the legality of
a Pennsylvania law that denied public assistance to legal
residents and an Arizona law that denied federally subsidized
benefits to legal residents who had not lived within the United
States for fifteen years. 36 Applying strict scrutiny, the Court
struck down both laws as violations of equal protection, reasoning
that a state’s fiscal interests and desire to preserve limited
welfare benefits for its own citizens did not justify this invidious
distinction between residents. 37
Although Graham is not one of the Court’s more celebrated
equal protection decisions, Harold Koh has described it as an
“equal protection landmark” for good reason. 38 It invoked United
States v. Carolene Products Co. 39 for the first time to declare that
“‘discreteness and insularity’ entitled a minority group to special
constitutional protection.” 40
35. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971).
36. Id. at 366–68.
37. Id. at 374–75.
38. Harold Hongju Koh, Equality with a Human Face: Justice Blackmun
and the Equal Protection of Aliens, 8 HAMLINE L. REV. 51, 59 (1985).
39. 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938).
40. Koh, supra note 38, at 59 (quoting Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene
Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1087, 1087 n.4 (1982)). This was the first
and only time the Court recognized a group as a suspect class because it was
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Under the Carolene Products rubric, recognition of a group as
a suspect class expresses how disfavored and minority status
renders that group powerless to vindicate their interests through
the political process. 41 Graham, however, did not engage in any
discussion of immigrants’ vulnerability or history of
discrimination. Perhaps considering immigrants’ categorical
exclusion from voting as self-evident political powerlessness, 42
the Court described “aliens as a class” as a “prime example” of a
group for which “heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate.” 43
That unanimous holding is particularly compelling—and
perhaps surprising—given that it came during a period when the
Court otherwise endeavored to contain the scope of its equal
both “discrete” and “insular” under Carolene Products. League of United Latin
Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 541 (2007) (Gilman, J., dissenting)
(citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290, n.28 (1978))).
Indeed, as the Court itself has noted, although it has never held that
“discreteness and insularity constitute necessary preconditions to a holding that
a particular classification is invidious,” “these elements have been relied upon in
recognizing a suspect class in only one group of cases, those involving aliens.”
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 438 U.S. at 290 n.28 (citing Graham v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971)).
41. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982) (stating “certain
groups, indeed largely the same groups, have historically been ‘relegated to such
a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection
from the majoritarian political process” (quotations and citation marks omitted)
(citing Graham, 403 U.S. at 367)); see also Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Not
Without Political Power”: Gays and Lesbians, Equal Protection and the Suspect
Class Doctrine, 65 ALA. L. REV. 975, 984–91 (2014) (critiquing the equal
protection doctrine’s process-oriented approach to evaluating political
powerlessness of suspect classes).
42. Daniel Kanstroom has argued that, in spite of their inability to vote,
non-citizens participate in the polity in ways that are essential to the “politicolegal legitimacy” of constitutional democracy, including through litigation. See
Daniel Kanstroom, “Alien” Litigation as Polity-Participation: The Positive Power
of a “Voteless Class of Litigants,” 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 399, 400, 439
(2012) (“While exclusion from voting, intimidation-by-deportation, and even a
certain moral marginalization have surely limited noncitizens’ ability to
leverage political power, alternative pathways have often been found to achieve
voice and politico-legal influence, and to develop and sustain new conceptions of
justice itself.”).
43. The Court reasoned that “classifications based on alienage, like those
based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial
scrutiny.” See Graham, 403 U.S. at 371–72 (citing Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S.
at 152–53 n.4).
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protection doctrine, 44 and in a case in which the Court could have
easily rested upon its separate preemption holding. 45 Moreover,
unlike earlier cases, 46 Graham’s equality analysis was devoid of
structural concerns; that is, the decision did not depend, or seek
to bolster itself, upon the federal government’s exclusivity over
immigration matters. 47 Instead, underlying Graham’s conception
of alienage as a suspect status is a strong normative vision of
lawfully present noncitizens as “respected, responsible and
participating member[s]” of society, 48 who deserve equal
treatment.
To be sure, Graham was not explicit about this normative
view; it did not even articulate with any precision its justification
for treating alienage as a suspect classification. 49 Nevertheless, in
explaining why Arizona’s and Pennsylvania’s laws did not meet
the demands of strict scrutiny, the Court emphasized that
lawfully present immigrants are similarly situated to citizens vis
a vis state governments, and thus entitled to similar treatment. 50
44. See Koh, supra note 38, at 59–60 (noting that at the time, the Court
was “refusing to name new suspect classifications, or to create new
‘fundamental rights’”). Koh further notes that looking back at Graham as the
Justices saw it in 1971, it appears an unlikely candidate as an equal protection
landmark. The parties addressed equal protection as the fourth of four
arguments challenging the statutes’ validity and devoted only five pages of their
brief to the argument. Id. at 58.
45. Graham, 403 U.S. at 379–80 (describing the basis for the Court’s
separate preemption holding); see Koh, supra note 38, at 59–60 (describing
Justice Blackmun’s success “in bringing state classifications that discriminate
against resident aliens under judicial scrutiny without provoking a dissent” as
surprising).
46. See infra Part II.A–B (discussing Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915)
and Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948)).
47. Indeed, Graham’s justification for applying strict scrutiny to the state
alienage cases, and for concluding that Pennsylvania’s and Arizona’s
anti-immigrant measures did not survive that scrutiny, never relied upon
federal supremacy in immigration matters. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365, 371 (1971).
48. Koh, supra note 38, at 98–99 (quoting Kenneth Karst, The Supreme
Court, 1976 Term—Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (1977)).
49. See Soucek, supra note 25, at 174 (stating that the Court did not
provide much explanation for the classification).
50. See Graham, 403 U.S. at 376 (noting that the state laws at issue
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The Court noted that, like citizens, lawful permanent residents
contribute financially to the state through both work and taxes,
may have longstanding connections to the state, and share
burdens of community membership similar to citizens, such as
being called into the armed services. 51 The Court therefore
reasoned that excluding this group of immigrants from a fair
share of state resources on account of their alienage is
“particularly inappropriate and unreasonable.” 52
It is this aspect of Graham—declaring the inherent
inequality of a system where migrants shoulder the
responsibilities of community membership, but not the benefits of
equal treatment—which, in spite of its uncertain basis for
treating alienage as a suspect status, makes it unmistakably an
equality decision. 53 It provides the most significant window into
the court’s normative visions of migrants as equal community
members, and a likely explanation for why it unanimously chose
not to resolve the case exclusively on preemption grounds.
B. Graham’s Limitations and Longevity
In decisions subsequent to Graham, the Court offered a
variety of explanations for its recognition of alienage as a suspect
classification. The Court alternately emphasized immigrants’
similarity to citizens, 54 their political powerlessness, 55 the historic
affected “two classes of needy persons, indistinguishable except with respect to
whether they are or are not citizens of this country”).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. In a later case, Toll v. Moreno, Justice Blackmun, Graham’s author,
explained that the Court’s decision recognizing alienage as a suspect status was
partly based upon its acknowledgment that distinctions drawn on the basis of
alienage-status are likely to reflect historic “antipathy” toward immigrants. 458
U.S. 1, 22 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
54. For example, in In re Griffiths, the Court noted the similarly of
“resident aliens” to citizens in justifying strict scrutiny. See 413 U.S. 717, 722
(1973) (reasoning that “[r]esident aliens, like citizens, pay taxes, support the
economy, serve in the Armed Forces, and contribute in myriad other ways to our
society,” such that “[i]t is appropriate that a State bear a heavy burden when it
deprives them of employment opportunities”).
55. In Foley v. Connelie, the Court explained Graham’s designation of
alienage as a suspect classification on grounds of noncitizen’s political
powerlessness, noting that Graham’s “heightened judicial solitude . . . [was]
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prejudice visited upon them as a group because of characteristics
beyond their control, 56 and even structural concerns about state
conflicts with federal immigration policy. 57 Although the lower
courts have selectively relied upon these explanations to reach
divergent results in cases involving lawfully present nonimmigrants, 58 the Supreme Court’s various explanations should
deemed necessary since aliens—pending their eligibility for citizenship—have
no direct voice in the political processes.” 435 U.S. 291, 294 (1978) (citing United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938)).
56. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982) (citing Graham and
noting that “[s]ome classifications are more likely than others to reflect deepseated prejudice rather than legislative rationality in pursuit of some legitimate
objective” and that “[c]lassifications treated as suspect tend to be irrelevant to
any proper legislative goal”).
57. In Foley v. Connelie, the Court suggested an additional justification
beyond immigrants’ political powerlessness. 435 U.S. at 295. The Court stated
that the state laws at issue in Graham and its progeny warranted close judicial
scrutiny because “they took position[s] seemingly inconsistent with the
congressional determination to admit the alien to permanent residence.” In spite
of Foley’s description, there is, however, little evidence that federalism concerns
factored into Graham’s equal protection holding at all. In making this
observation, Foley cites Graham’s separate preemption holding. Id. (citing
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 377–78 (1971)).
58. In particular, divergent views regarding the significance of the Court
citing lawful permanent residents’ “similarity” to citizens in Graham has
resulted in a circuit split as to whether strict scrutiny applies to lawfully
present nonimmigrants, including individuals with student and visitor visas.
Compare Van Staden v. St. Martin, 664 F.3d 56, 59 (5th Cir. 2011) (concluding
that Louisiana’s denial of nursing licenses to nonimmigrants as a class did not
warrant strict scrutiny under Graham because unlike lawful permanent
residents, nonimmigrants are not similarly situated to citizens), LeClerc v.
Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 418, 421 (5th Cir. 2005) (applying rational basis review to a
Louisiana law that rendered lawfully present nonimmigrants ineligible to take
the Louisiana Bar Exam after concluding that nonimmigrants, unlike lawful
permanent residents, are not “similarly situated to citizens in their economic,
social, and civic (as opposed to political) conditions”), and League of United
Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 533, 536 (6th Cir. 2007) (agreeing
with LeClerc that lawful permanent residents are similar to citizens in that
“they pay taxes, support the economy, serve in the armed forces, and are
entitled to reside permanently in the United States” but that nonimmigrants
are not, such that a Tennessee law making lawfully present nonimmigrants
ineligible for drivers’ licenses should be reviewed under rational basis scrutiny),
with Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66, 72, 75 (2d. Cir. 2012) (applying strict
scrutiny and striking down a New York licensing statute that excluded lawfully
present nonimmigrants from the pharmacy profession after rejecting the Fifth
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at most suggest that there are multiple good reasons for
designating alienage as a suspect classification. 59
In fact, in spite of its ambiguity, the Supreme Court has
never retreated from Graham’s recognition that lawfully present
migrants are entitled to equal treatment by the states when they
distribute state resources and benefits or regulate economic
activity. Indeed, in the years after Graham, the Court has
continued to closely scrutinize state laws singling out immigrants
for special burdens and economic disadvantages, 60 even while
recognizing two significant limitations upon its equal protection
holding.
I. The Political Function Exception
Only two years after Graham, the Court recognized that
strict scrutiny might not always apply to state alienage
classifications. In 1973 in Sugarman v. Dougall, 61 the Court
recognized that states could constitutionally deny noncitizens
access to certain state democratic political institutions because
noncitizens, who cannot vote, have no legitimate claim to equal

and Sixth Circuits’ view that under Graham the similarities between citizens
and aliens “articulate[d] a test for determining when state discrimination
against any one subclass of lawful immigrants is subject to strict scrutiny” and
concluding that, in any event, nonimmigrants are similar to citizens).
59. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216 n.14 (citing “[s]everal formulations” that explain
the Court’s “treatment of certain classifications as ‘suspect’” including the
historic prejudice visited upon vulnerable groups, that classifications treated as
suspect tend to be irrelevant to any proper legislative goal, and certain group’s
political powerlessness).
60. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 718–22 (1993) (invalidating a
Connecticut statute restricting the bar exam to citizens); Bernal v. Fainter, 467
U.S. 216, 227–28 (1984) (invalidating a Texas statute requiring that notaries
public be U.S. citizens); Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 7–12 (1977)
(invalidating a statute barring certain resident non-citizens from state financial
assistance for higher education); Exam. Bd. Eng’rs, Architects & Surveyors v.
De Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 602 (1975) (striking state laws preventing resident noncitizens from obtaining engineering licenses); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S.
634, 646 (1973) (invalidating a New York statute barring employment of noncitizens in the state’s classified competitive civil service).
61. 413 U.S. 634, 647–49 (1973).
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participation in this arena. 62 Sugarman articulated what later
became known as the political function exception—a doctrine that
led the Court in a series of cases in the late 1970s and early 80s
to uphold under rational basis review a variety of state laws
excluding noncitizens from public employment. 63
Significantly, in recognizing this exception to Graham,
Sugarman also signaled the end to Court’s separation of
federalism concerns from equal protection analysis involving
state alienage restrictions. The Court’s justification for
modulating its equal protection scrutiny in cases involving state
political functions rested heavily on federalism concerns, albeit
not respect for the federal immigration power, but rather, states’
Tenth Amendment power to regulate elections and define their
political community. 64
The Sugarman Court described this state power broadly to
include “not only” the selection of voter qualifications, but also
decisions about eligibility for “state elective or important
nonelective executive, legislative, and judicial positions.” 65 The
Court reasoned that officers who formulate, execute, or review
public policy “perform functions that go to the heart of
representative government.” 66 Accordingly, when states exclude
62. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 296 (1978) (citing Sugarman, 413 U.S.
at 647–49).
63. Although Sugarman gave life to the political function exception, in
resolving that particular case, the Court struck down a provision of a New York
law that conditioned eligibility for permanent state civil service positions on
citizenship. Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 646. The Court reasoned that the blanket
ban on employment of noncitizens had “little, if any relation” to a state interest
in preserving its political institutions. Id. at 646–47.
64. See Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 647
Just as the Framers of the Constitution intended the States to keep
for themselves, as provided in the Tenth Amendment, the power to
regulate elections, (e)ach State has the power to prescribe the
qualifications of its officers and the manner in which they shall be
chosen. Such power inheres in the State by virtue of its obligation,
already noted above, “to preserve the basic conception of a political
community.”
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
65. Id.
66. Id. According to the Court, a state has the prerogative to exclude
noncitizens “from participation in its democratic political institutions” on
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noncitizens from such functions and the Court is therefore
presented “with matters resting firmly within a State's
constitutional prerogatives,” Sugarman suggested the Court’s
scrutiny would “not be so demanding.” 67
Not long after, the Court confronted a slew of equal
protection challenges to state laws excluding immigrants from
public employment. The Court upheld most of the laws under a
deferential rational basis scrutiny. 68 For example, it upheld laws
excluding lawful permanent residents from employment as state
troopers in Foley v. Connelie, 69 public school teachers in Ambach
v. Norwich, 70 and probation officers in Cabell v. Chavez-Salido. 71
In each case, the Court was sharply divided. 72 Although the
dissenting justices did not dispute that alienage status could
justify the exclusion of noncitizens from voting and related
political functions, they criticized the majority’s acceptance of a
wide range of public employment involving non-discretionary
decision-making as actually serving such functions. For example,
in his dissent in Foley, Justice Stevens criticized the Court’s
political function cases as sanctioning discrimination that
perpetuated political patronage that necessarily and historically
excluded noncitizens. 73
account of its historic and constitutional “responsibility for the establishment
and operation of its own government, as well as the qualifications of an
appropriately designated class of public office holders.” Id. at 648.
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 444 (1982) (upholding a
citizenship requirement for probation officers); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68,
80 (1979) (upholding a citizenship requirement for public school teachers); Foley
v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 299–300 (1978) (upholding a citizenship requirement
for police officers).
69. 435 U.S. 291, 296 (1978).
70. 441 U.S. 68, 73–74 (1979) (affirming “the general principle that some
state functions are so bound up with the operation of the State as a
governmental entity as to permit the exclusion from those functions of all
persons who have not become part of the process of self-government”).
71. 454 U.S. 432, 439 (1982).
72. In Foley, the decision was 6–3, and in Ambach and Cabell, the Court
divided 5-4.
73. See Foley, 435 U.S. at 308–09 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The widespread
exclusion of aliens from such positions today may well be nothing more than a
vestige of the historical relationship between nonvoting aliens and a system of
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Debate about the political function cases and their impact on
Graham’s theory of equality continued years later, even as the
Court moved away from equal protection as the primary means of
analyzing state alienage classifications. Chief Justice Rehnquist,
dissenting as a then-Associate Justice in Toll v. Moreno, 74 for
example, later questioned whether immigrants’ political
powerlessness was a “legitimate reason for treating aliens as a
‘suspect class,’” given that the Court had also relied upon this
very characteristic to justify state restrictions excluding
noncitizens from state political functions. 75 He contended that
this dualism reflected the Court’s growing discomfort with
alienage as a suspect classification, 76 a proposition sharply
disputed by Graham’s author, Justice Blackmun, in response. 77
Justice Blackmun noted the multiple reasons for treating
alienage as a suspect status and rejected the notion that the
political function cases are incompatible with that recognition. 78

distributing the spoils of victory to the party faithful.”).
74. 458 U.S. 1 (1982).
75. Id. at 41 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also cases cited supra note 68
(upholding various citizenship requirements).
76. See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 42 n.12 (1982) (“If the Court has
eschewed strict scrutiny in the ‘political process’ cases, it may be because the
Court is becoming uncomfortable with the categorization of aliens as a suspect
class.”).
77. Justice Blackmun responded that Graham recognized that lawfully
present noncitizens are similarly situated to citizens “for most legislative
purposes,” such that distinctions drawn on the basis of alienage-status are likely
to reflect historic “antipathy” toward immigrants. Id. at 22 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring). He reasoned that the politic function exception did not undermine
these fundamental principles because noncitizens’ political powerlessness only
heightened the need for judicial protection given migrants’ inability to respond
to such antipathy through the political process. Id. at 23. He further noted that
the reason for a discrete and insular minority’s exclusion from political power
has never been significant; “instead, the fact of powerlessness is crucial, for in
combination with prejudice it is the minority group’s inability to assert its
political interests that ‘curtail[s] the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities.’” Id. (quoting United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938)).
78. Id. at 19–22 (“[T]he Court always has recognized that aliens may be
denied use of the mechanisms of self-government, and all of the alienage cases
have been decided against the backdrop of that principle.”).
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He reasoned that “[i]f this dual aspect of alienage doctrine is
unique, it is because aliens constitute a unique class.” 79
The political function cases can fairly be criticized on their
own terms. To be sure, it is difficult to reconcile the Court’s
various conclusions as to whether particular public employees
“perform functions that go to the heart of representative
government”80—for instance, that a probation officer is more
essential to a state’s political community than a lawyer.81 But the
exception itself does not undermine Graham’s theory of immigrants’
rights. In fact, it reinforces it.82
As Justice Blackmun explained in his opinion in Toll, that the
Constitution permits the exclusion of noncitizens “from participating
in the process of self-government makes particularly profound the
need for searching judicial review of classifications grounded on
alienage” status.83 Indeed, migrants’ political powerlessness
“overcomes the usual presumption that even improvident decisions
affecting minorities will eventually be rectified by the democratic
79. Toll, 458 U.S. at 22.
80. Id. According to the Court, recognizing a state’s prerogative to exclude
noncitizens “from participation in its democratic political institutions” simply
acknowledges the state’s historic and constitutional “responsibility for the
establishment and operation of its own government, as well as the qualifications
of an appropriately designated class of public office holders.” Id. at 648.
81. Compare Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 444 (1982) (upholding
a citizenship requirement for probation officers), with In re Griffiths, 413 U.S.
717, 726–27 (1973) (applying strict scrutiny and striking down under the Equal
Protection Clause a Connecticut law barring lawful permanent residents from
taking the bar exam), and Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 646 (1973)
(invalidating a New York statute barring employment of non-citizens in the
state’s classified competitive civil service). See also Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S.
68, 81 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (describing inconsistent outcomes in
political function cases).
82. See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 22 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(reasoning that the Court’s political function decisions “pointedly have declined
to retreat from the position that restrictions on lawfully resident aliens that
primarily affect economic interests are subject to heightened judicial scrutiny,”
“reflect[ing] the Court’s proper judgment that the alienage cases are not
irreconcilable or inconsistent with one another”).
83. See id. at 23 (reasoning that “the fact of powerlessness is crucial, for in
combination with prejudice it is the minority group’s inability to assert its
political interests that curtails the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities”) (internal quotations and
citation omitted).
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process.”84 As Daniel Kanstroom has stated, “[t]he problem for
noncitizens is deeper than minority status[;]. They do not get outvoted; they cannot vote at all.” 85 While this relationship does not
undermine the rationale for either doctrinal thread, commentators 86
and jurists alike, 87 nevertheless, have pointed—unconvincingly—
to this exceptionalism as evidence that Graham’s theory of
equality is untenable.
The political function doctrine, however, is not a case of the
exception swallowing the rule. Rather, two distinct and
reconcilable rules inform the doctrine. Courts permit
discrimination against non-citizens in the context of state laws
relating to political participation because of states’ sovereign
authority to determine membership in their political community.
Outside of that realm, however, citizenship most often is
irrelevant to other state legislative purposes.
2. The Equal Protection Dichotomy
The second major qualification of Graham came only a few
years later in Mathews v. Diaz, 88 when the Court held that
Graham’s recognition of alienage as a suspect classification did

84. Id.
85. Kanstroom, supra note 42, at 436.
86. See Cox, supra note 10, at 352 (charging that the Court’s alienage
doctrine is incoherent because “in some cases courts have suggested that
alienage classifications are suspect and trigger heightened scrutiny, but in other
cases courts have suggested that some alienage restrictions are due great
judicial deference”).
87. See, e.g., Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 649, 658 (1973)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (questioning Graham and criticizing the Sugarman
majority’s reliance upon Graham’s reasoning that migrants and citizens are
“indistinguishable for purposes of equal protection analysis”); Toll, 458 U.S. at
41 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting) (“If the exclusion of aliens from the political
processes is legitimate, as it clearly is, there is reason to doubt whether political
powerlessness is any longer a legitimate reason for treating aliens as a ‘suspect
class’ deserving of ‘heightened judicial solicitude.’”); Korab v. Fink, 748 F.3d
875, 889 (9th Cir. 2014) (Bybee, J., concurring) (“A review of the history of
alienage jurisprudence, with a particular review of Graham . . . suggests that it
is time to rethink the doctrine.”).
88. 426 U.S. 67 (1975).
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not apply to laws enacted by Congress. 89 The Court declined to
view federal laws distinguishing between citizens and noncitizens
as presumptively invidious, given Congress’s “broad power over
naturalization and immigration.” 90 In light of the federal
government’s responsibility for the regulation of migrants, rooted
in its authority over foreign affairs, the Court declined to
encroach upon congressional decisions regarding whether and
when the nature of an immigrant’s relationship with the United
States might warrant an equal share of public resources. 91
In language that engendered—and has since long been cited
in preserving—an “equal protection dichotomy” in cases involving
alienage status, the Court identified the divergent outcome in
Graham as consistent, and actually supportive, of the Court’s
decision in Mathews. 92 The Court reasoned that Graham’s equal
protection
analysis
“involved
significantly
different
considerations because it concern[ed] the relationship between
aliens and the States rather than between aliens and the Federal
Government.” 93 According to the Court, “a division by a State of
the category of persons who are not citizens of that State into
subcategories of United States citizens and aliens has no
apparent justification, whereas, a comparable classification by
the Federal Government is a routine and normally legitimate
part of its business.” 94
Unlike Graham, Mathews’ equal protection analysis turned
upon structural concerns. The Court disclaimed a meaningful
judicial role in checking the political branches’ decisions related
to immigration policy, reciting the familiar contours of the
plenary power doctrine: that “[t]he reasons that preclude judicial
89. See id. at 84–85 (distinguishing Graham and applying rational basis
review to a federal Medicare restriction based on alienage status after reasoning
that equal protection analysis “involves significantly different considerations”
when “it concerns the relationship between aliens and the States rather than
between aliens and the Federal Government”).
90. Id. at 79–80.
91. Id. The Court declared it “unquestionably reasonable for Congress to
make an alien's eligibility depend on both the character and the duration of his
residence.” Id. at 83.
92. Id. at 84–85.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 85.
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review of political questions also dictate a narrow standard of
review of decisions made by the Congress or the President in the
area of immigration and naturalization.” 95
At the time, scholars criticized Mathews for accepting that
Congress’s alienage-based restriction on benefits challenged in
the case actually constituted an immigration regulation. 96 In the
decades that followed, however, courts and commentators have
generally accepted the dichotomy between the equal protection
obligations of the state and federal governments with respect to
migrants as a justifiable distinction based upon their respective
powers. 97 In fact, the divergent standards have comfortably
existed as an anomaly within equal protection doctrine more
broadly, which, outside the context of alienage status, requires
congruence between the equal protection requirements applicable
to federal and state governments through the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 98 Indeed, in Adarand Constructors, Inc.
95. Id. at 81–82.
96. See Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference that
Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047, 1066 (1994) (discussing criticism); see
also Gerald M. Rosberg, The Protection of Aliens from Discriminatory Treatment
by the National Government, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 275, 334 (1997) (arguing that
the restriction on Medicare benefits in Mathews v. Diaz, “was not in any obvious
way concerned with immigration”); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation
of Aliens and the Constitution, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 862, 869 (1989) (arguing that
“the courts have wrongly assumed that every federal regulation based on
alienage is necessarily sustainable as an exercise of the immigration power”).
97. See Bosniak, supra note 96, at 1105 (noting that “[o]ver time . . . the
distinction between the two cases has come to be treated as largely self-evident”
and commentators have accepted “the contrast as the inevitable result of the
division of labor between the states and the federal government”); Gerald L.
Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws: Government Services, Proposition 187, and the
Structure of Equal Protection Doctrine, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1439 (1995)
(“Congressional discrimination receives deference because it is presumed to
reflect the weighing of factors that the states are neither likely nor
constitutionally competent to assess.”).
98. Specifically, Adarand Constructors v. Pena confirmed that the
guarantees of equal protection mean the same thing under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments—what Justice O’Conner called, in the context of racebased classifications, “congruence.” See 515 U.S. 200, 226–27 (1995) (holding
“that all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local
governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict
scrutiny”). In Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954), the Court earlier
stated that because “the Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining
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v. Peña, 99 the case in which the Court clarified this principle of
“congruence,” Justice O’Conner referenced the special deference
to federal immigration regulations as an appropriate exception to
the general rule of congruence. 100
In the end, Graham survived two significant limitations upon
its holding. 101 One might expect its requirement of strict scrutiny
to be insulated from shifts in federal immigration policy,
particularly in light of its characterization of alienage as a “prime
example” of Carolene Products vulnerability, 102 and the Court’s
discussion of state equal protection obligations to lawfully present
immigrants separate and apart from federalism and supremacy
concerns. As the following discussion demonstrates, however,
within a recent body of federal and state court decisions that has
not been the case. The following section explores this disconnect
and offers some initial explanations for it.

racially segregated public schools, it would be unthinkable that the same
Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government.”
99. 515 U.S. 200, 217–18 (1995).
100. Indeed, the Court has expressly accepted non-congruence in the
alienage cases. See id. (“We do not understand a few contrary suggestions
appearing in cases in which we found special deference to the political branches
of the Federal Government to detract from this general rule.” (citing Hampton v.
Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100, 101–02 n.21 (1976) (discussing federal power
over immigration))). Moreover, even after Mathews, the Court continued to cite
Graham as an example of a suspect classification requiring heightened judicial
scrutiny. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 n.14 (1982) (citing Graham’s
requirement of strict scrutiny); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 290 (1978) (citing Graham when discussing suspect classifications).
101. As Linda Bosniak has noted, in subsequent cases “the Court has
reaffirmed the equality analysis” and its vision of aliens as the proper “subjects
of equality.” See Bosniak, supra note 96, at 1056, 1107 (citing In re Griffiths, 413
U.S. 717, 729 (1973)) (holding that Connecticut’s wholesale ban of resident noncitizens from admission to the bar violates the Equal Protection Clause);
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 646 (1973) (striking down a New York law
that allowed only citizens to hold permanent positions in the competitive class of
the state civil service).
102. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1971) (citing United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938)).
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B. Federalism on the Rise

In spite of Graham, recently before the lower courts, equal
protection jurisprudence addressed to alienage status has focused
less on rights and more on constitutional structure, operating
much like preemption doctrine in that the validity of state laws is
largely determined not by the state’s justification, but rather by
congressional policy choices. State classifications that treat
lawfully present immigrants differently from citizens on the basis
of alienage status are likely to be upheld if a state’s restriction is
consistent with federal immigration law or if Congress purports
to “sanction” the state’s action. 103 Conversely, courts have cited
conflicts with federal immigration policy in striking down state
alienage classification on equal protection grounds. 104
Though this trend has wider reach, the prime example of
federalism’s recent impact in equal protection doctrine involving
lawfully present immigrants is the line of cases interpreting the
1996 welfare reform act, the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA). 105 Several courts
have viewed PRWORA’s authorization for states to deny
state-funded public benefits to immigrants as dispositive of the
equal protection inquiry. 106 As a result, these decisions have
103. See cases cited supra note 87 (providing examples where courts found
that the challenged law was consistent with federal immigration law or that
Congress sanctioned the state’s action).
104. See, e.g., Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66, 69 (2d Cir. 2012) (applying
strict scrutiny to a New York licensing statute that excluded lawful
nonimmigrants from the pharmacy profession because the regulatory scheme
“seeks to prohibit some legally admitted aliens from doing the very thing the
federal government indicated they could do when they came to the United
States—work”).
105. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA or Welfare Reform Act of 1996), Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105
(1996).
106. See, e.g., Soskin v. Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242, 1255 (10th Cir. 2004)
(upholding Colorado’s alienage-based denial of healthcare benefits to lawful
permanent residents based upon PRWORA); Korab v. Fink, 748 F.3d 875, 887
(9th Cir. 2014) (upholding Hawaii’s limitation of public benefits available to
resident immigrants because of PRWORA); Bruns v. Mayhew, 750 F.3d 61, 72
(1st Cir. 2014) (upholding Maine’s alienage-based denial of public benefits
because of PRWORA).
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upheld alienage-based restrictions in state public benefits
schemes under a rational basis scrutiny historically reserved for
the federal government’s immigration regulations. 107
For example, in 2004, in Soskin v. Reinertson, 108 a divided
panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld a
Colorado law denying healthcare benefits to lawful permanent
residents on equal terms as citizens. It did so under rational basis
scrutiny, reasoning that Graham did not dictate the result in
light of the “specific Congressional authorization for the state’s
action, the PRWORA.” 109 In 2014, the First 110 and Ninth
Circuits 111 cited Soskin and upheld similar laws limiting public
benefits to immigrants based upon alienage status, after applying
rational basis scrutiny.
Although the circuit courts reasoned that Graham’s vitality
was not in question because it did not, according to the courts,
address the impact of congressional action purporting to sanction
states’ differential treatment of lawfully present noncitizens 112—
this qualification actually minimizes—and misconstrues—a
significant piece of Graham’s reasoning. Specifically, in Graham,
the Supreme Court expressly rejected the argument that
Congress could authorize alienage-based discrimination by the
states, after Arizona argued that its imposition of an
alienage-based durational residency requirement for welfare
benefits was authorized by the Social Security Act of 1935. 113 The
107. Cases discussed infra Part IV.
108. See 353 F.3d at 1255 (citing PRWORA and reasoning that if “a state
determines that the burden” or providing state-funded benefits “is too high and
decides against optional coverage, it is addressing the Congressional concern
(not just a parochial state concern) that individual aliens not burden the public
benefits system” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
109. Id. at 1251.
110. Bruns v. Mayhew, 750 F.3d 61, 61 (1st Cir. 2014).
111. Korab, 748 F.3d at 875.
112. See Bruns, 750 F.3d at 66 (stating “the alienage-based distinction in
this case does not originate purely from state legislation, unlike the restrictions
struck down in Graham”); Korab, 748 F.3d at 882 (viewing Hawaii’s
post-PRWORA denial of healthcare benefits as presenting a hybrid case between
Graham’s and Mathews’s “pristine examples of the bookends on the power to
impose alien classifications”).
113. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 382 (1971) (refusing to
construe the federal statutes cited by Arizona and Pennsylvania as
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Court reasoned that “[a]lthough the Federal Government
admittedly has broad constitutional power to determine what
aliens shall be admitted to the United States, the period they
may remain, and the terms and conditions of their naturalization,
Congress does not have the power to authorize the individual
States to violate the Equal Protection Clause.” 114
The convergence in equal protection scrutiny applicable to
state and federal laws that has developed in spite of this
reasoning thus exposes a potential crack in Graham’s foundation.
Indeed, Judge Jay Bybee’s concurring opinion in the 2014 Ninth
Circuit case, Korab v. Fink, 115 spotlights what he portrayed as a
major fissure.
In addressing an equal protection challenge to Hawaii’s
PRWORA-sanctioned denial of health care benefits to lawfully
present state residents, Judge Bybee opined that courts should
employ “preemption analysis instead of equal protection analysis
in alienage cases,” 116 reincarnating earlier scholarly debates
regarding which form of constitutional review should resolve
challenges to state laws classifying on the basis of alienage
status. 117 Citing the political function cases, the equal protection
“authoriz[ing] discriminatory treatment of aliens at the option of the States”
which would present “serious constitutional questions”).
114. Id. (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638–41 (1969)).
115. See 797 F.3d 572, 584 (9th Cir. 2014) (Bybee, J., concurring) (writing
“separately to explain why the law of alienage remains so unclear and how we
might better approach it”).
116. See id. at 585 (“The equal protection principle announced in Graham
has proven unsustainable.”). Declaring equal protection doctrine involving
alienage discrimination a “conundrum,” Judge Bybee charged that Graham’s
theory of alien rights was “unsupportable” from the start given the Supreme
Court’s unwillingness to impose the same equal protection obligations upon the
Federal Government in accordance with Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)
(stating that it would be “unthinkable” if the equal protection obligations of the
Federal Government under the Fifth Amendment were not coextensive with the
equal protection obligations of the States). Id. at 888.
117. See Neuman, supra note 97, at 1430–31 (rejecting the argument that
equal protection doctrine concerning immigrants is unduly complex and should
“be abandoned and replaced by a federal preemption analysis”); Koh, supra note
38, at 87 (noting that recent commentators had “hailed federal preemption as
the unseen solution to the ‘glaring doctrinal anomaly’ in the Court’s alienage
jurisprudence” and “that preemption and equal protection have been described
as ‘vying for predominance in the field of alienage’”).
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dichotomy, and the more deferential scrutiny applicable to
classifications based upon migrants’ undocumented status, Judge
Bybee opined that the Graham doctrine was unworkable because
it has been “riddled with exceptions and caveats that make
consistent judicial review of alienage classifications difficult.” 118
On the one hand, Judge Bybee’s call to abandon equal
protection analysis in favor of preemption is remarkable, given
that the case involved a state’s differential treatment of lawfully
present residents and citizens in a state public benefits scheme—
a classic Graham fact pattern, notwithstanding the added
consideration of PRWORA. Even more so, Judge Bybee posed his
dramatic proposition—doing away with equal protection analysis
for lawfully present migrants—without demonstrating any actual
incoherence in the alienage doctrine, beyond describing the
existence of Graham’s exceptions. 119 This is an odd argument
given that exceptions, in fact, can bring coherence to a rule that
does not apply in every case. On the other hand, Judge Bybee’s
concurrence might be less a provocative entreaty to substitute
preemption as the response to immigrant claims of unequal
treatment and instead simply a candid description of what, in
many instances, is already occurring—a variant of preemption
posing as equal protection analysis. 120
118. Korab v. Fink, 797 F.3d 572, 585 (9th Cir. 2014) (Bybee, J., concurring).
119. For example, Judge Bybee posits that “[f]rom the outset, the Graham
rule, simpliciter, was unsupportable” because it could never apply to the federal
government, while Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. at 500, established that the
federal and state equal protection obligations must be the same. See Korab, 797
F.3d at 589–90. But Graham’s rule was specifically addressed to migrants’ right
to equal treatment by the states regarding public resources and economic
opportunities. The Court did not profess to create a rule that also applied to the
federal government’s immigration regulations, which are authorized, in part, by
the federal government’s exclusive authority to manage foreign affairs. The
Court has concluded that congruence simply is not compelled when it comes to
powers possessed exclusively by the federal government, but not the states. See
Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 217–18 (1995) (“We do not
understand a few contrary suggestions appearing in cases in which we found
special deference to the political branches of the Federal Government to detract
from this general rule.” (citing Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100,
101–102 n.21 (1976) (federal power over immigration))).
120. See Heeren, supra note 11, at 374 (“Although courts are willing to
enforce the federal government’s power to preempt state immigration law and to
deeply probe the rationality of immigration decisions, they are less likely to
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Part III analyzes this recent influence of federalism in the
new equal protection jurisprudence embodied by Soskin, and the
decisions that have followed it, and demonstrates why Judge
Bybee is wrong: federalism can play a meaningful role in equal
protection doctrine involving alienage status without hollowing
out the Fourteenth Amendment’s anti-discrimination norms
altogether in favor of the Supremacy Clause. That Graham might
not apply in every alienage case is not a fatal flaw.
This disconnect between Graham’s promise of equality and
the disruptive impact of federalism on recent equal protection
jurisprudence in the realm of immigrants’ rights has not received
the critical attention it deserves. Scholarship has questioned the
basis for distinguishing between federal immigration regulations
and state “alienage” classifications, given the overlapping nature
of laws regulating migrants’ entry and exit, and their lives once
present in the United States. 121 One commentator has analyzed
how preemption and skepticism of agency decision-making have
substituted for rights-based analysis, following a shift away from
concede what was once a given—that immigrants are largely entitled to equal
treatment.”).
121. Adam Cox describes immigration rules as selection rules governing who
may enter or exit the country or “how we choose immigrants” and immigration
regulation laws—referred to as “alienage” law when it comes to the states—or
“how we treat those immigrants whom we have chosen.” Cox, supra note 10, at
370. Linda Bosniak describes the two domains as one of membership and
personhood, or regulation “inside” immigration law, and regulation “outside.”
Bosniak, supra note 96 at 1058. As Hiroshi Motomura has noted, these
categories are often difficult to separate because of their “functional overlap” in
that “‘[a]lienage’ rules may be surrogates for ‘immigration’ rules” where the
“intended and/or actual effect of an alienage rule is to affect immigration
patterns.” Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration and Alienage, Federalism and
Proposition 187, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 201, 202 (1994) [hereinafter Immigration and
Alienage]. Vice versa, Motomura argues that “‘immigration’ rules may be
surrogates for ‘alienage’ rules” where, for example, “the intended and actual
effect of deportation grounds is to regulate the everyday lives of aliens in the
United States no less than do rules governing their access to public benefits.” Id.
at 203. As Adam Cox has argued, “The process of selecting immigrants is deeply
and irrevocably intertwined with the process of regulating their daily lives.”
Cox, supra note 10, at 393. For her part, Clare Huntington argues that the
blurring of immigration and alienage regulation suggests that “it makes more
sense to think about immigration law and alienage law as part of a continuum
of immigration regulation.” Huntington, supra note 10, at 826.
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equal protection when courts assess laws regulating migrants. 122
Other scholars have viewed PRWORA’s “authorization” to the
states to decide for themselves whether or not to provide statefunded benefits to immigrants as an unlawful attempt by
Congress to devolve immigration authority to state
governments. 123 Absent from the literature, however, is a critical
account of the blurring line in equal protection doctrine between
federal and state laws classifying on the basis of alienage status
and whether Graham’s promise of equality has been realized, or
subordinated to interloping federalism concerns.
Michael Wishnie’s argument that Congress is powerless to
alter states’ Fourteenth Amendment obligations by sharing its
immigration power with the states provides an important
starting place for this much-needed conversation. Following
PRWORA’s adoption, he argued that Congress could not insulate
the states from the requirements of equal protection because the
federal power to regulate immigration is “exclusively national”
and incapable “of devolution to the states.” 124 Wishnie reasoned
that to expand the deference afforded to the federal government
to state regulations affecting immigrants would “erode the
antidiscrimination and anticaste principles that are at the heart
of our Constitution.” 125
122. See Heeren, supra note 11, at 372 (noting that “when immigrants make
communitarian claims for equal treatment—a share in the privileges and
benefits of citizenship—their claims are increasingly rejected”). Heeren has
argued that a narrowing of equal protection doctrine as a general matter has
made it “more difficult for noncitizens to prevail on individual rights claims” and
has forced advocates to find “alternative theories” in federalism and
administrative law outside “the arena of individual rights.” Id. at 207–08.
123. See Wishnie, supra note 14, at 496 (“The Welfare Act’s authorization of
state discrimination against immigrants was an attempt by Congress to devolve
some of the exclusively federal immigration power to the states . . . .”);
Huntington, supra note 10, at 839 (“Under the PRWORA, the federal
government delegates its authority to determine eligibility for federal benefits to
states and localities.”); see also Victor C. Romero, Devolution and
Discrimination, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 377, 386 (2002) (describing
outcomes of immigration devolution as a “mixed bag” with regard to class based
discrimination where devolution could open the door for state innovation
regarding rights, including for same-sex couples).
124. Wishnie, supra note 14, at 494.
125. Wishnie, supra note 14, at 494, 553.
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Wishnie’s conclusion that PRWORA did not alter states’
Fourteenth Amendment obligations to lawfully present migrants
is convincing, but his primary inquiry, whether Congress can
delegate immigration lawmaking authority to the states, does not
fully explain PRWORA’s impact or the recent convergence in
equal protection jurisprudence involving federal and state
alienage classifications.
Specifically, in the years since Wishnie’s article, the courts
that have sanctioned state denials of welfare benefits to
immigrants under rational basis scrutiny have not considered the
states to be exercising a delegated immigration power. Rather,
PRWORA has served a different legitimizing function. In a
variety of ways, explained in more detail in Part III, courts have
viewed federal policy much in the way they would in a
preemption case: so long as Congress does not object to the states’
alienage-based denials of benefits, such measures are deemed
valid and complementary to congressional policy. 126
Moreover, the uniform rule doctrine, which many courts have
relied upon to justify applying rational basis review to state
denials of public benefits to migrants, is not really a delegation
doctrine, but a supremacy one. That is, when courts accept that
Congress has created a uniform immigration rule for states to
follow, they are really concluding that Congress has set
immigration policy, which the Supremacy Clause requires states
to follow; they are not ruling that Congress has shared (or
devolved) immigration rulemaking power so that the states may
set their own immigration law. 127 But courts have muddied this
doctrinal distinction by concluding that PRWORA established a
uniform rule for states to follow in circumstances where Congress
did not mandate particular state action and instead recognized
states’ discretion with respect to state-funded healthcare
benefits. 128 This analysis is, in my view, a flawed application of
126. Infra Part III.
127. See infra notes 199–207 (discussing Plyler).
128. See, e.g., Korab v. Fink, 797 F.3d 572, 581 (9th Cir. 2015).
Considering the Welfare Reform Act as a whole, it establishes a
uniform federal structure for providing welfare benefits to distinct
classes of aliens. The entire benefit scheme flows from these
classifications, and a state’s limited discretion to implement a plan
for a specified category of aliens does not defeat or undermine
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the uniform rule doctrine, and delegation does not therefore
explain, nor justify, the courts’ conclusions.
In addition, Wishnie acknowledged that the devolution that
is the focus of his argument was “not explicit” in PRWORA but
“should be presumed because, under any other construction of the
Welfare Act, the current rash of anti-immigrant state welfare
rules are obviously invalid under Graham’s settled rule that state
welfare
discrimination
against
legal
immigrants
is
unconstitutional.” 129 But that framing fails to account for how
federalism principles more broadly, even without delegation,
could similarly and illegitimately undermine Graham. That is,
delegation is not the only means by which courts might affect a
rollback of Graham. Whereas Wishnie’s article took aim at the
reasons why delegation could not insulate states from the
requirements of equal protection (given his argument that the
federal government cannot devolve the immigration power to the
states), this Article argues Congress cannot through its own
policy choices sanction state discrimination against immigrants.
Moreover, while the shift in equal protection examined in
this Article has largely occurred in a particular set of cases
interpreting PRWORA, 130 its import goes beyond the construction
of a single statute. First, the preempting of equal protection
described in these cases reinforces an already existing tendency
in the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence—Graham
notwithstanding—to emphasize the structural concerns of
federalism in equal protection cases involving alienage-status. 131
uniformity. In arguing to the contrary, the dissent ignores that “a
state’s exercise of discretion can also effectuate national policy.”
(quoting Soskin v. Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242, 1257, 1255 (10th Cir. 2004)).
129. Wishnie, supra note 14, at 496.
130. See, e.g., Soskin v. Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242, 1255 (10th Cir. 2004)
(applying rational basis scrutiny to Colorado’s PRWORA-based alien eligibility
restrictions); Korab v. Fink, 748 F.3d 875, 877 (9th Cir. 2014) (upholding
Hawaii’s PRWORA-based health benefits law for classes of nonimmigrant
aliens); Bruns v. Mayhew, 750 F.3d 61, 63 (1st Cir. 2014) (upholding Maine’s
termination of medical assistance benefits post-PRWORA).
131. See, e.g., Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948)
(“State laws which impose discriminatory burdens upon the entrance or
residence of aliens lawfully within the United States conflict with this
constitutionally derived federal power to regulate immigration, and have
accordingly been held invalid.”); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 295 (noting

110

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 77 (2016)

While that emphasis has historically worked to reinforce
immigrants’ rights, the latest iteration of this tendency before the
lower courts demonstrates how Graham’s promise of
constitutionally protected equality is vulnerable when federalism
concerns dictate equal protection analysis, allowing the inevitable
political variability of federal immigration policy to largely
determine immigrants’ right to equal treatment by the states. In
other words, the federalism problem for noncitizens’ equal
protection rights that PRWORA helps to expose may also extend
beyond that statute’s attempt to immunize state denials of
welfare benefits.
Indeed, expansive deference to federalism concerns and
congressional policy is evident outside the PRWORA context in
cases involving lawfully present immigrants’ equal access to
professional licenses, drivers’ licenses, and other employment
opportunities. 132 These cases cannot be theorized based upon the
delegation theory that is the focus of Wishnie’s insightful
critique 133 because the anti-immigrant measures in those
instances were not enacted pursuant to a purportedly authorizing
federal statute. There are thus important reasons to better
understand these doctrinal developments and potential impact
beyond PRWORA and the delegation theory that that statute
necessarily invites. To do so, federalism’s existing and potential
role in equality analysis must be established.

that the states “took position[s] seemingly inconsistent with the congressional
determination to admit the alien to permanent residence”).
132. See, e.g., Van Staden v. St. Martin, 664 F.3d 56, 61–62 (5th Cir. 2011)
(upholding under rational basis review a Louisiana statute that denied lawful
nonimmigrants the ability to apply for nursing licenses); LeClerc v. Webb, 419
F.3d 405, 431 (5th Cir. 2005) (upholding under rational basis review a Louisiana
rule that rendered lawfully present nonimmigrants ineligible to take the
Louisiana Bar Exam); Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66, 81 (2d Cir. 2012)
(applying strict scrutiny to strike down a New York licensing statute that
excluded lawfully present nonimmigrants from the pharmacy profession).
133. See Wishnie, supra note 14, at 496 (explaining that Congress devolved
“some of the exclusively federal immigration power to the states”).
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III. Federalism’s Historic Role in the State Alienage Cases
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence addressed to state laws
classifying on the basis of alienage status has been pendular—
swinging between two constitutional doctrines, preemption and
equal protection. Recently, the Court has evaluated the legality of
state laws targeting immigrants largely through the Supremacy
Clause. 134 But for a time, equal protection was the Supreme
Court’s preferred means of resolving challenges to state laws
imposing alienage-based burdens on states’ immigrant
residents. 135 But even in these cases, the Court has often justified
the result based upon the federal government’s exclusive
authority to regulate immigration to the United States and the
conditions of immigrants’ authorization to remain here. 136
The multiple explanations and normative goals that might
account for the Court’s reliance upon federalism principles in
these equal protection cases are identified and critiqued below.
This catalogue and criticism provides a foundation for this
Article’s ultimate claim: that federalism can play a legitimate role
in equal protection doctrine involving alienage status when it
serves as a lens through which to gauge arbitrary discrimination,
whether state or federal, but federalism should not stealthily
serve as a preemption-like doctrine beneath the surface in equal
protection cases. 137 When the validity of state laws
134. See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1982) (declining to decide whether
a Maryland law excluding nonimmigrants from public tuition benefits violated
equal protection, and instead striking down the law on preemption grounds);
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2495 (2012) (striking down three
Arizona immigration enforcement measures under the Supremacy Clause);
Whiting v. Chamber of Commerce, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1970 (2011) (analyzing
validity of Arizona business licensing law that addressed unauthorized
employment of noncitizen workers under preemption).
135. See Heeren, supra note 11, at 398 (“The Burger Court struck down an
extraordinary amount of state legislation on equal protection grounds. In at
least two of these cases, the plaintiffs also raised preemption . . . .”). The Court
first focused on equal protection as a means of regulating state alienage
classifications in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), and Truax v. Raich,
239 U.S. 33 (1915).
136. Cases cited infra notes 138–174.
137. This potentially disruptive impact of federalism and supremacy
principles on migrants’ equal protection claims before the states contrasts with
typical sovereignty-based federalism objections which Heather Gerken notes

112

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 77 (2016)

disadvantaging immigrants turns on congressional policy choices,
the Fourteenth Amendment’s antidiscrimination norms are
forfeited to majoritarian politics.
A. Ultra Vires State Action
Long before Graham, courts considered federalism principles
in equal protection cases involving alienage status as a means of
ferreting out arbitrary state motivations. Under this approach,
state action imposing burdens uniquely upon immigrants for
purposes of immigration control is treated as presumptively
unjustified and discriminatory because the state lacks power to
regulate immigration in the first place. 138 The Court’s 1915
decision in Truax v. Raich 139 exemplifies this approach.
In Truax, the Court struck down an Arizona law that
required businesses with more than five employees to maintain
80% of the positions for qualified electors and “native-born
citizens,” reasoning that denying noncitizens the right to work
solely because of their alienage status undermined “the very
essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the
purpose of the Amendment to secure.” 140 But although the Court
decided Truax on the basis of equal protection, federalism
concerns figured prominently in the Court’s reasoning. 141
often reflect concerns that “local power is a threat to minority rights” and that
“state decisions that fly in the face of deeply held national norms will be
insulated from reversal.” Heather K. Gerken, Foreword, Federalism All the Way
Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 9, 46 (2010).
138. Bryan Soucek, in an article analyzing the role of federalism in equal
protection jurisprudence addressed to marriage equality (and the alienage cases
by comparison), proposes that federalism be factored into equal protection
analysis under a similar “interest constraining” approach, whereby the ability of
the state or federal government to justify discrimination is limited by the
relative strength or weakness of the particular sovereign’s authority to regulate
in a given area. Soucek, supra note 25, at 167–71.
139. 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
140. Id. at 41.
141. Id. at 42. In spite of its holding as to private employment, Truax
suggested that states could nevertheless preserve public resources for citizens at
the expense of noncitizens. See id. at 40 (noting that the
“discrimination . . . involved” was particularly unjustified because it “imposed
upon the conduct of ordinary private enterprise”). Graham later disavowed this
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Even without mentioning the Supremacy Clause, the Court’s
reasoning sounded in preemption doctrine. 142 The Court reasoned
that the “legitimate interests of the State . . . cannot be so broadly
conceived as to bring them into hostility to exclusive Federal
power,” over immigration control, namely the decision “to admit
or exclude aliens.” 143 That authority, the Court noted, “is vested
solely in the Federal Government.” 144 The Court characterized
the denial of the opportunity to earn a livelihood as “tantamount
to the assertion of the right to deny [immigrants] entrance and
abode” such that Arizona’s law would conflict with federal law. 145
Specifically, “those lawfully admitted to the country under the
authority of the acts of Congress, instead of enjoying in a
substantial sense and in their full scope the privileges conferred
by the admission, would be segregated in such of the States as
chose to offer hospitality.” 146
One might fairly read the federalism analysis in Truax as an
unstated alternative ground for striking down the law under the
Supremacy Clause. 147 But even if Truax contains an embedded
aspect of Truax, noting that the Court’s subsequent decision in Takahashi v.
Fish & Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410 (1948), discussed infra, rejected this
special public-interest doctrine. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374
(1971) (concluding “a State’s desire to preserve limited welfare benefits for its
own citizens” failed to justify the states’ denial of benefits to legal residents).
142. Although Truax was decided on equal protection grounds, in 2012 the
Supreme Court cited it in Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2507 (2012),
a preemption case. There, the Court invalidated several provisions of an Arizona
law which sought to “discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of
aliens and economic activity by persons unlawfully present in the United
States.” Id. at 2497 (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11–1051 (2012)).
143. Truax, 239 U.S. at 42.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See id. (reasoning that “in ordinary cases [immigrants] cannot live
where they cannot work”).
147. Given the Court’s emphatic description of the equal protection violation
and the promise of equality under the Fourteenth Amendment, Truax cannot be
dismissed solely as a preemption decision masquerading under an equal
protection label. For example, the Court reasoned
that the right to work for a living in the common occupations of the
community is of the very essence of the personal freedom and
opportunity that it was the purpose of the Amendment to secure. If
this could be refused solely upon the ground of race or nationality, the
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preemption holding, it is clear that the Court considered the
state’s wanting authority to regulate immigration as relevant to
its equal protection obligations.
For example, the Court rejected the state’s purported interest
in limiting the employment of non-citizens because only the
federal government may determine the standards under which
migrants may lawfully work. 148 The Court reasoned that the
state’s power “to make reasonable classifications in legislating to
promote the health, safety, morals and welfare” did not empower
it “to deny to lawful inhabitants, because of their race or
nationality, the ordinary means of earning a livelihood.” 149 The
Court held that Arizona had acted beyond its police power
authority to reach the subjects of immigration lawmaking and
thus could not justify its action under the Equal Protection
Clause. 150
Truax predates many of the Court’s landmark decisions
establishing the contours of modern equal protection doctrine,
including United States v. Carolene Products. 151 But elements of
this ultra vires approach persisted in the Court’s later alienage
cases. For example, in 1977, in Nyquist v. Mauclet, 152 the Court
approached federalism concerns in a similar manner, striking
down on equal protection grounds a New York statute that made
citizenship an eligibility requirement for state tuition assistance.
There, the Court rejected New York’s claim that it could exclude
legal residents from access to financial aid to incentivize
noncitizens to naturalize. 153 The Court concluded that New York
did not present a “permissible” state purpose because
prohibition of the denial to any person of the equal protection of the
laws would be a barren form of words.
Id. at 41.
148. See id. at 43 (reasoning that the Court must consider whether
“underlying the classification is the authority to deal with that at which the
legislation is aimed”).
149. Id. at 41.
150. See id. at 42–43 (“The authority to control immigration—to admit or
exclude aliens—is vested solely in the Federal Government.”).
151. 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938).
152. 432 U.S. 1 (1977).
153. See id. at 10 (“Control over immigration and naturalization is entrusted
exclusively to the Federal Government, and a State has no power to interfere.”).
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immigration control and the authority to regulate naturalization
“is entrusted exclusively to the Federal Government, and a State
has no power to interfere.” 154
This ultra vires approach considers federalism as a “legal
tool” to discern improper government motives and unjust
treatment; it does not serve as a means of negotiating the
relationship between the federal government and the states at
the expense immigrants’ rights. 155 In this sense, it operates much
like the Court’s recognition of suspect classifications and
application of strict scrutiny, 156 but with attention to the entity
alleged to have discriminated. That is, instead of focusing on the
qualities of the recipient of discrimination that renders a
government classification suspect, it focuses on the
characteristics of the government discriminating to discern
whether its regulation of subjects beyond its reach reveals an
invidious purpose.
Moreover, the ultra vires approach ensures that structural
concerns do not supplant rights in equal protection doctrine
involving alienage status because it has the advantage of working
in only one direction. Concluding that the government has no
authority to regulate a specific area such that its action is ultra
vires serves as a good proxy for whether or not the state has
classified in an improper manner, but the reverse is not
necessarily true. If a state has sufficient power to act with respect
to a given subject—or acts consistently with the Federal
Government—should not resolve the equal protection inquiry,
which must still, of course determine whether the state’s chosen
classification is justified by a sufficient state interest. 157
154. Id.
155. See Neuman, supra note 97, at 1434 (“The substantive constitutional
command of equal protection should not be confused with the standards of
review or other judicial ‘tests’ employed to police government compliance with
that command.”). Gerald Neuman has criticized scholars who claim that the
dichotomized approach to equal protection in alienage cases is illogical and
unworkable because of the different standards. He notes that “[t]his argument
erroneously treats ‘suspectness’ as an objective description of reality rather than
a legal tool.” Id. at 1435.
156. Id.
157. See, e.g., Barannikova v. Greenwich, 643 A.2d 251, 261–62 (Conn. 1994)
(“The fact that a state may act within a given realm provided it does not conflict
with federal legislation, does not also imply that when so acting it may make
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The growing influence of immigration federalism—which,
contests the notion of an exclusive federal power over
immigration matters, and accepts some room for state
regulation 158—complicates the simplicity of this approach to
discerning federalism’s role in equal protection doctrine. If one
accepts that state and federal governments share more power
than previously acknowledged to regulate migrants, determining
what is ultra vires is not so simple.
B. Rights-Enhancing Immigration Policy
A rights-enhancing theory of federal immigration authority
provides another potential explanation for how federalism
concerns might matter in equal protection doctrine involving
alienage status. Under this account, migrants’ claim to equal
treatment by the states is derivative of, or enhanced by, the
status conferred upon them by the federal government. This
explanation emphasizes the Federal Government’s exclusive and
plenary authority over immigration matters and suggests that
that sovereign’s decision to admit migrants into the country
under federal law carries with it certain guarantees, namely, that
the persons admitted will receive equal treatment by the states.
This account is evident in the Court’s 1948 decision in
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission, 159 decided more than
three decades after Truax. In Takahashi, the Court struck down
a California law restricting fishing licenses to lawfully present
migrants “ineligible for citizenship.” 160 Takahashi addressed a
specific question left open by Truax: whether a state might
possess a special public interest in preserving certain state
resources—there, licenses to fish in coastal waters—for citizens

invidious distinctions without regard to the constitutional equal protection
guarantee.”).
158. See Elias, supra note 10, at 705–06 (“This ‘new immigration federalism’
is and will be grounded in immigrant-inclusionary rulemaking, which has the
potential to complement (as well as occasionally contradict) federal efforts at
comprehensive immigration reform.”).
159. 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
160. Id. at 417.
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at the expense of noncitizens. 161 Although the Court
acknowledged that California’s alienage restriction raised
important questions of both “federal-state relationships and of
constitutionally protected individual equality and liberty,” 162 it
opted for an equal protection rationale as the ground for
invaliding the state measure, even as its decision once again
focused heavily on federal exclusivity over immigration
matters. 163 It noted:
The Federal Government has broad constitutional powers in
determining what aliens shall be admitted to the United
States, the period they may remain, regulation of their
conduct before naturalization, and the terms and conditions of
their naturalization. Under the Constitution the states are
granted no such powers; they can neither add to nor take from
the conditions lawfully imposed by Congress upon admission,
naturalization and residence of aliens in the United States or
the several states. State laws which impose discriminatory
burdens upon the entrance or residence of aliens lawfully
within the United States conflict with this constitutionally
derived federal power to regulate immigration, and have
accordingly been held invalid. 164

The Court tethered this discussion to its equal protection
analysis partly through an ultra vires analysis of state
regulation. The Court reasoned that federal exclusivity over
immigration matters “emphasize[d] the tenuousness of the state’s
claim that it has power to single out and ban its lawful alien
inhabitants.” 165
161. Id.
162. Id. at 414–15.
163. Id. at 419. The Court later exhibited an openness, in spite of
Takahashi’s equal protection holding, to recast it as a preemption decision. In
Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982), the Court acknowledged “the actual basis for
invalidation of the California statute was apparently the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution.” Id. at 11 n.16. But it noted “pre-emption played a
significant role in the Court’s analysis,” citing the work of two commentators
who claimed that “many of the Court’s decisions concerning alienage
classifications, such as Takahashi, are better explained in pre-emption than in
equal protection terms.” Id. (citing Michael J. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A
Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1060–65 (1979); Levi,
supra note 21).
164. Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 419 (citation omitted).
165. Id. at 420. The Court also rejected the notion that the state could coopt
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But Takahashi also relied upon a separate, rights-enhancing
theory of federal immigration power to justify its equal protection
holding. The Court suggested that the Federal Government’s
decision to grant lawfully present immigrants the right to enter
and live in the country effectively triggers migrants’ claim to
equal treatment by the states. 166 Citing Truax, the Court
explained that in that case Arizona’s attempt to suppress the
employment of noncitizens was invalid because “having been
lawfully admitted into the country under federal law,” the
plaintiff “had a federal privilege to enter and abide in any State
in the Union and thereafter under the Fourteenth Amendment to
enjoy the equal protection of the laws of the state in which he
abided.” 167
The rights-enhancing theory of federalism treats
congressional policy as a gatekeeper to Fourteenth Amendment
rights, allowing Congress to decide who has claims to such
rights. 168 But long before Takahashi, as well as after, the Court
has interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment as applying to “all
persons” within the United States, regardless of their
immigration status. 169 In other contexts, the Court has also
federal classifications and put them to use for its own purposes. Id. The Court
reasoned that “the power of a state to apply its laws exclusively to its alien
inhabitants as a class is confined within narrow limits” whereas Congress has
“broad and wholly distinguishable powers over immigration and naturalization.”
Id.
166. Id. at 415–16 (citing Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915)).
167. Id. (quotation omitted).
168. For similar reasons, scholars have noted the inadequacy of preemption
as a substitute for equal protection analysis: It removes migrants’ fair treatment
from the concerns of constitutional equality to the domain of policymaking. See
Koh, supra note 38, at 97 (explaining the inadequacies of preemption as a
substitute for equal protection in cases involving discrimination against
noncitizens); Bosniak, supra note 96, at 255 (suggesting that federalism and the
Supremacy Clause concern “institutional process” or “who decides” and not who
are the “the rightful subjects of equality”).
169. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (recognizing that
noncitizens are “persons” within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment);
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1987) (rejecting the state’s argument “that
undocumented aliens, because of their immigration status, are not ‘persons
within the jurisdiction’ of the State of Texas, and that they therefore have no
right to the equal protection of Texas law”).
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turned back congressional attempts to dictate Fourteenth
Amendment rights. 170
That said, a federalism theory recognizing that Congress
may enhance migrants’ claims to equal treatment under the
Constitution complements the Court’s view of legislative power
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as a one-way
ratchet: Congress is empowered to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment to achieve its remedial purposes, but cannot act to
restrict its reach. 171 The ratchet theory, however, is not a perfect
analogy for this potential role of federalism in equal protection
cases involving alienage-status. When the federal government
grants or restrict immigrants license to enter or remain within
the country, it is not enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment, nor
even the slightest bit interested in remedying the inequality and
institutionalized racism that led to the Amendment’s enactment.
Rather, when the Executive exercises its plenary immigration
authority in this way, the federal government is making policy
choices based upon such variables as economic conditions,
political concerns, and foreign affairs.
A rights-enhancing view of federal immigration authority
thus invites the result that the economic and political vagaries of
federal immigration policy will dictate the scope of state equal
protection obligation. 172 And in many instances, federal
immigration policy often does not enhance the standing of
migrants under the Fourteenth Amendment. As others have
170. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529 (1997) (striking down the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 as exceeding Congress’s enforcement
power under Section 5 of Fourteenth Amendment, stating that “[i]f Congress
could define its own powers by altering the Fourteenth Amendment's meaning,
no longer would the Constitution be ‘superior paramount law, unchangeable by
ordinary means’” (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803))).
171. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966) (stating that § 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment is a “positive grant of legislative power” for
Congress to pass legislation that “secure[s] the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment”); see also Guttentag, supra note 14, at 45 (arguing that
immigration preemption doctrine should take full account of federal policy
grounded in the Civil Rights Act of 1870 that immigrants receive equal
treatment).
172. Indeed, many of the lower courts that have upheld alienage-based cuts
to public benefits and professional opportunities have held just that. Infra Part
III.
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noted, the assumption that the federal government is more
protective of immigrant rights than the states over-simplifies the
complex nature of federal immigration regulation and, in many
instances, is simply inaccurate. 173 A theory that injects
federalism into equal protection analysis involving state
treatment of immigrants in this way could therefore invite
doctrinal inconsistency and confusion.
For example, if a rights-enhancing theory of federal
immigration law explains the result in Graham, it makes the
Court’s decision in Mathews, five years later, much harder to
reconcile. If state measures imposing burdens upon immigrants
are closely scrutinized because they effectively deny “entrance
and abode,” as Takahashi put it, 174 and therefore conflict with the
federal government’s decision to admit such immigrants to
permanent residence under an equality of legal privileges, then
Congress’s decision to deny lawful permanent residents federal
Medicare benefits would seem similarly inconsistent with its own
decision to grant certain migrants permanent residence. Perhaps
Mathews merely solidifies that within the Court’s sweeping
deference to the federal government’s immigration regulations
the Court will not second-guess even inconsistent policy choices.

173. See Gerken, supra note 137, at 46 (citing traditional nationalist
perspective in federalism scholarship that “local power is a threat to minority
rights”). Other scholars have contested the assumption that the federal
government is more protective of immigrants than the states. See, e.g.,
Rodríguez, supra note 10, at 570–71 (criticizing scholarly debates about
immigration federalism as “currently framed” because they “largely have
focused on whether the national government or the states will be better at
protecting or advancing immigrants’ interests”). But see Johnson, supra note 11,
at 618–19 (describing the “long history of state and local laws that discriminate
against immigrants” and arguing that, while “civil rights concerns [do not]
disappear from the field just because the federal government is regulating
immigration, . . . the potential civil rights deprivations at the state and local
levels are likely to be greater because of the fact that nativist and racist
sentiments are more likely to prevail”).
174. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 416 (1948) (quoting
Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915)).
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C. Congressional Imprimatur for State Discrimination
It is clear as a matter of preemption doctrine that courts do
not cloak state laws which adopt federal immigration
classifications as their own with a presumption of legitimacy,
based upon imputed congressional endorsement of the
regulation. 175 On the contrary, under the Supremacy Clause, the
Court considers whether Congress intended to occupy the field of
regulation or whether a seemingly harmonious state law might,
nevertheless, frustrate Congress’s purpose. 176 In the equal
protection context, however, the Court has not been as clear
about the extent to which federal immigration policy—
particularly with respect to undocumented migrants—might
provide an imprimatur of legitimacy to state laws that
discriminate against noncitizens.
On the one hand, in Plyler v. Doe, 177 the Court invalidated
under equal protection a Texas law that denied free public school
education to undocumented children, in part by reasoning that
the plaintiffs’ presence in the United States in violation of federal
law did not justify the state’s discrimination. But on the other
hand, the Court noted that migrants’ unlawful presence is
constitutionally relevant to the scope of their equal protection
rights. 178 Specifically, the Court rejected Texas’s position that
175. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2502–03 (2012) (striking
down under the Supremacy Clause an Arizona law that created an alien
registration requirement, even where Arizona argued that “the provision had
the same aim as federal law and adopts its substantive standards”). The Court
reasoned that the provision’s purported harmony with congressional
immigration policy did not save it from preemption given the “basic premise of
field preemption—States may not enter, in any respect, an area the Federal
Government has reserved for itself.” Id. at 2502.
176. See generally Lauren Gilbert, Immigrant Laws, Obstacle Preemption
and the Lost Legacy of McCulloch, 33 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 153, 159
(2012) (describing the various forms of federal preemption).
177. 457 U.S. 202, 226 (1982).
178. Id. at 219, 224–26. Here, the Court’s analysis reads very much like a
preemption decision and cites De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976), in which
the Court upheld a California restriction on the employment of noncitizens as
consistent with the Supremacy Clause. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 225–26. The Court
stated:
As we recognized in De Canas v. Bica, the States do have some
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Congress had provided an “imprimatur” of legitimacy to the
state’s discrimination because, in contrast to the legally present
migrants in Takahashi, Congress had not admitted the
undocumented children “on an equality of legal privileges with all
citizens under non-discriminatory laws.” 179 Yet, the Court
accepted that congressional policy might modulate a state’s equal
protection obligations, stating that in any equal protection
challenge involving “the treatment of aliens, . . . courts must be
attentive to congressional policy,” for “the exercise of
congressional power might well affect the State’s prerogatives to
afford differential treatment to a particular class of aliens.” 180
Although the Court did not provide much guidance on when
congressional policy might bolster a state’s authority to
discriminate against noncitizens, Plyler suggests that the policy
in question must be directly related to the discriminatory state
classification employed. There, the Court rejected Texas’s
position, noting an absence of federal law and policy “concerning
the State’s authority to deprive [undocumented] children of an
education.” 181
Yet, even the Court’s limited endorsement of this theory of
federalism’s role in equal protection doctrine is ambivalent. While
accepting that congressional policy “might well affect the State’s
authority to act with respect to illegal aliens, at least where such
action mirrors federal objectives and furthers a legitimate state goal.
In De Canas, the State’s program reflected Congress’ intention to bar
from employment all aliens except those possessing a grant of
permission to work in this country. In contrast, there is no indication
that the disability imposed by § 21.031 corresponds to any
identifiable congressional policy. The State does not claim that the
conservation of state educational resources was ever a congressional
concern in restricting immigration. More importantly, the
classification reflected in § 21.031 does not operate harmoniously
within the federal program.
Id. (quotation omitted).
179. Id. at 224 (quoting Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 420). The Court reasoned
that congressional “disapproval of the presence of these children within the
United States, and the evasion of the federal regulatory program that is the
mark of undocumented status” did not provide Texas with “authority for its
decision to impose upon them special disabilities.” Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 224–25.
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prerogatives to afford differential treatment,” 182 the Court
simultaneously walked back slightly from that statement,
acknowledging that “[i]f the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection was available only to those upon whom Congress
affirmatively granted its benefit, the State’s argument would be
virtually unanswerable.” 183 The Court reasoned that the “Equal
Protection Clause operates of its own force to protect anyone
‘within [the State’s] jurisdiction’ from the State’s arbitrary
action.” 184
To be sure, the disconnect between the Court’s holding and
its statement regarding the “relevance” to equal protection
analysis of a migrant’s status under federal immigration law was
partly driven by its exceptional facts. Dissenting in Plyler, Chief
Justice Burger accused the Court of treating plaintiffs as a
quasi-suspect class given their status as children and their
interest in education as a quasi-fundamental right. 185 Plyler,
nevertheless, provides a doctrinal opening for the inverse of a
rights-enhancing theory of federal immigration policy to take
shape. 186
182. Id. at 224.
183. Id. at 225 n.21.
184. Id.
185. See id. at 244 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court for
“patching together bits and pieces of what might be termed quasi-suspect-class
and quasi-fundamental-rights analysis” to “spin[ ]out a theory custom-tailored
to the facts of these cases”).
186. The dissent in Plyler endorses Takahashi’s rights-enhancing view of
federalism, including its inevitable inverse. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 246
n.7 (1982) (Burger, J., dissenting)
[S]tate discrimination against legally resident aliens conflicts with
and alters “the conditions lawfully imposed by Congress upon
admission, naturalization and residence of aliens in the United States
or the several states” . . . [but] the same cannot be said when
Congress has decreed that certain aliens should not be admitted to
the United States at all.
(quoting Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948)).
Whether a state’s equal protection obligations ought to be modulated when a
regulation affects undocumented immigrants—or, put another way, when is
undocumented status constitutionally relevant to equal protection rights and to
what degree—is beyond the scope of this Article. But, of course, the issue bears
upon the rights of lawfully present immigrants, particularly if one accepts, as
many courts recently have, that federalism matters to state equal protection
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D. Dissimilarly Situated by Immigration Policy

Federal immigration policy might also impact equal
protection analysis of state alienage classifications, if courts view
migrants’ status under federal law as relevant to whether they
are similarly situated to their citizen counterparts. Graham
emphasized that legal residents are similarly situated to citizens
for most state legislative purposes, 187 citing their shared right to
work, obligation to pay taxes, and eligibility to be drafted, 188 but
without crediting these attributes of group membership—which
result from federal policy choices—directly to federalism
concerns. Nevertheless, in emphasizing attributes derivative to a
migrants’ status under federal law, Graham effectively obliged
Plyler to hold that undocumented migrants’ different status
under federal law was not a “constitutional irrelevancy.” 189
In the end, to focus on whether migrants are similarly
situated to citizens may really be asking something more
fundamental: as Linda Bosniak has put it, when does citizenship
matter? 190 Is it only when the federal government regulates entry
obligations based upon a rights-enhancing view of federal immigration policy.
See infra Part III.D (addressing Fifth and Sixth Circuit decisions upholding
state laws imposing burdens upon lawfully present nonimmigrants based upon
the theory that unlike lawful permanent residents Congress has not admitted
nonimmigrants to the United States under an equality of legal privileges). Plyler
is one example where undocumented immigrants’ unauthorized presence in the
United States was not determinative of this group’s equal protection rights. But
it has not provided a strong basis to protect undocumented migrants from state
discrimination in other contexts. See Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of Others:
Legal Claims and Immigration Outside the Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1723, 1734 (2010)
(“So far, history has shown Plyler to be a high-water mark, and not a decision
that prompted a new era in equal protection for unauthorized migrants
generally.”).
187. See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 22 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(reasoning that Graham recognized that lawfully present noncitizens are
similarly situated to citizens “for most legislative purposes,” such that
distinctions drawn on the basis of alienage-status are likely to reflect historic
“antipathy” toward immigrants).
188. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971).
189. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982) (declining to recognize
undocumented immigrants as a suspect class).
190. See Bosniak, supra note 96, at 1148 (stating that courts will continue to
be called upon to determine the “significance of the status of alienage—
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and exit to the United States and who can vote and participate in
state political functions? Or can it matter when the states enact
measures disadvantaging immigrants with respect to state
resources and economic opportunities?
E. Preemption Instead
Federalism principles play the most decisive role in equal
protection cases involving immigrants when courts opt not to
address alleged equal protection violations at all and instead
invalidate laws on the basis of the Supremacy Clause. Since
Plyler, the Supreme Court has often utilized preemption to
evaluate state restrictions based upon alienage. 191 As Kerry
Abrams has argued, the preemption focus is not surprising, at
least in the case of undocumented migrants, as it “substitutes for
the lack of an equal protection doctrine that adequately protects”
that group from discrimination. 192 But the Court has sometimes
opted for preemption, even when the legislation at issue
concerned lawfully present migrants.
For example, in Toll v. Moreno, 193 decided later in the same
term as Plyler, the Supreme Court declined to address an equal
protection question involving a University of Maryland policy
that denied in-state tuition to lawfully present non-immigrant
G-4 visa holders, even though citizens and lawful permanent
including undocumented alienage—for the allocation of rights and benefits in
our society”).
191. See Toll, 458 U.S. at 13 (striking down a University of Maryland policy
that denied in-state tuition to lawfully present nonimmigrants as preempted by
federal law); De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356–57 (1976) (upholding a
California law prohibiting employers from hiring undocumented workers as
valid under the Supremacy Clause); Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492,
2497–98 (2012) (striking down on preemption grounds three sections of an
Arizona statute addressed to immigration enforcement); see also Heeren, supra
note 11, at 369–70 (suggesting that in earlier eras, the Court was more likely to
closely address “questions of individual rights” than “structural questions”
presented by state laws regulating migrants and noting that in Plyler, the
“Court never addressed the preemption issue; it resolved the case on equal
protection grounds”).
192. Abrams, supra, note 10, at 601.
193. 458 U.S. 1 (1982).
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residents could obtain in-state tuition so long as they were
domiciled in the State. 194 The district court held that the policy
violated equal protection and, in the alternative, was preempted
by federal law. 195 But the Supreme Court sidestepped the equal
protection issue altogether, affirming the lower court’s decision
exclusively on the basis of the Supremacy Clause. 196 The
concurring and dissenting opinions provide some clues as to why.
Chief Justice Rehnquist in dissent questioned Graham’s
continuing vitality in light of the political function exception,
which he viewed as calling Graham’s central premise into doubt.
That dissent provoked a spirited response from Justice
Blackmun, Graham’s author. 197 Given that friction, and the fact
that Plyler struck down a state law disadvantaging
undocumented immigrants, the Court was likely hesitant to
expand Graham beyond the class of lawful permanent residents
to those who, though lawfully present in the United States,
constituted non-immigrant visitors. 198
194. Id. at 3. G-4 visas applied “to nonimmigrant aliens who are officers or
employees of certain international organizations, and to members of their
immediate families.” Id. at 4.
195. Id. at 9.
196. Id. at 9–10. As to the Supremacy Clause, the Court concluded that
Congress preempted Maryland’s policy of denying in-state tuition to G-4 visa
holders on the basis of their immigration status because it specifically permitted
that class of nonimmigrants to establish domicile in the United States and
provided them with preferential tax treatment. Id. at 14. According to the
Court, Maryland’s denial of in-state tuition thus amounted to “an ancillary
burden not contemplated by Congress in admitting these aliens to the United
States,” id. at 14 (quotation omitted), and frustrated the federal policy of
inducing such international organizations “to locate significant operations in the
United States” through preferential treatment. Id. at 16.
197. Supra note 74 and accompanying text; see also Bosniak, supra note 96,
at 1107 n.257 (noting that in bypassing the equal protection question in Toll,
the Supreme Court did not explain why supremacy was its preferred mode of
analysis).
198. See Bosniak, supra note 96, at 1107 n.257 (noting “the likely
explanation for the resort to preemption doctrine in Toll v. Moreno [is] the fact
that the state wasn’t discriminating against permanent residents, and the Court
wasn’t sure it wanted to extend strict scrutiny to categories of nonimmigrant
aliens, including resident nonimmigrants” (quoting Letter from Gerald L.
Neuman, Professor, Columbia Law School, to Author (Oct. 15, 1994) (on file with
author))). Graham did not necessarily foreclose extension of suspect class status
to this group; it spoke of “alienage” as a suspect class, and other decisions like
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Before the lower courts, the Supremacy Clause has played an
additional role in equal protection cases, particularly those
involving PRWORA. Specifically, courts have recognized what
some have referred to as the “uniform rule” doctrine, 199 whereby
state regulations targeting migrants receive the deference
applicable
to
the
Federal
Government’s
immigration
classifications if Congress has specifically directed “the States to
implement national immigration objectives” in a uniform
manner. 200 Courts reason that, because “the Constitution
empowers Congress to ‘establish [a] uniform Rule of
Naturalization,’” state action that follows a uniform immigration
rule mandated by the federal government should also be
considered with similar deference. 201
This doctrine originates from language in Plyler, addressing
exclusive federal authority over immigration matters and state
responsibility to respect the supremacy of federal immigration
law. 202 In an influential footnote, the Court first noted that the
federal government may constitutionally employ alienage
classifications to distinguish between individuals because such
distinctions “may be intimately related to the conduct of foreign
policy, to the federal prerogative to control access to the United
States, and to the plenary federal power to determine who has
sufficiently manifested his allegiance to become a citizen of the
Nation.” 203 Noting that “[n]o State may independently exercise a
like power,” the Court, citing De Canas v. Bica, 204 a preemption
Takahashi, which struck down discriminatory state laws involved classifications
against nonimmigrants like the G-4 visa holders in Toll. But the question of
whether suspect classification status under Graham applies to nonimmigrants
was unsettled at the time of Toll and remains so today, with the Circuit Courts
of Appeals split on this issue. See infra Part IV.D (analyzing these federal
decisions).
199. See generally, e.g., Korab v. Fink, 748 F.3d 875 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing
Plyler’s uniform rule language).
200. Aliessa ex rel Fayad v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085, 1098 (N.Y. 2001) (“If
the rule were uniform, each State would carry out the same policy under the
mandate of Congress—the only body with authority to set immigration policy.”).
201. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219
n.19 (1982)).
202. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 n.19 (1982).
203. Id.
204. 424 U.S. 351 (1976).

128

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 77 (2016)

case, then clarified, however, that states do not act independently
when they follow the mandates of the federal government
pursuant to the Supremacy Clause. The Court explained that “if
the Federal Government has by uniform rule prescribed what it
believes to be appropriate standards for the treatment of an alien
subclass, the States may, of course, follow the federal
direction.” 205
What the Court had in mind when it articulated this
principle is not entirely clear. It certainly did not spell out the
effect on states’ equal protection obligations of “uniform rules”
prescribed by the federal government. Nor did the Court clarify
whether following “the federal direction” would include states
opting, on their own accord, to follow the federal government’s
lead, or whether it only referred to states following specific
directives from the federal government. In the end, Plyler simply
may have been articulating a principle of supremacy, under
which it follows that states do not violate equal protection
because they are constrained to follow federal immigration
directives. 206 Several lower courts, however, have expanded
Plyler’s footnote beyond that simple meaning, upholding state
laws adopting federal immigration classifications as their own
under deferential rational basis review, without first concluding
that Congress mandated a specific rule for the states to follow in
a uniform manner. 207
205. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219 n.19.
206. See generally Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 103 (1976)
(striking down federal Civil Service Commission alienage-based employment
restriction targeting lawful permanent residents but noting the result would be
different if the exclusion “were expressly mandated by the Congress or the
President”); In re Adoption of a Child by L. C., 425 A.2d 686, 693 (N.J. 1981)
(rejecting equal protection challenge to state law regulating birth certificates of
foreign born adoptees after reasoning that “a state may deny benefits to aliens if
the discrimination against aliens is rationally related to the state's
constitutional obligation to avoid conflicts with federal law and imposes no
burdens on aliens not anticipated by Congress”).
207. See, e.g., Soskin v. Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242, 1255 (10th Cir. 2004)
(rejecting the view that the “federal government's imprimatur for” state
alienage discrimination “cannot reduce the level of scrutiny to which the state's
choice is subjected under the Equal Protection Clause” while acknowledging
that Congress in PRWORA did not enact a uniform federal immigration policy
and direct the states to follow it); Korab v. Fink, 748 F.3d 875, 884 (9th Cir.
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IV. The Collapse of the Equal Protection Dichotomy?
Although the Supreme Court has never revisited Graham, in
recent years, a number of decisions by the state courts and three
federal circuit courts have eroded the distinction between federal
laws classifying on the basis of alienage status and those wrought
by the states. 208 And they have done so based upon a variety of
rationales, most of which privilege structural concerns about the
preeminence of federal immigration policy at the expense of
immigrants’ rights. 209
The below discussion explores the breakdown in the equal
protection dichotomy that has long governed cases involving
alienage status and the role of federalism concerns in that result.
This discussion examines the post-PRWORA public benefits
cases, as well as the federal circuit court split regarding the level
of equal protection scrutiny applicable to laws barring temporary
workers
from
professional
licenses
and
employment
opportunities.
In the public benefit cases, PRWORA has driven these
results. That law, enacted by Congress in 1996, made most
noncitizens ineligible for means-tested federal benefits, such as
Medicaid. 210 Specifically, Congress deemed most lawful
2014) (recognizing that PRWORA allows states “discretion to implement a plan
for a specified category of aliens” but concluding that this “does not defeat or
undermine uniformity” because “a state’s exercise of discretion can also
effectuate national policy”).
208. See generally Soskin, 353 F.3d 1242 (applying rational basis review to
state denial of healthcare benefits); Bruns v. Mayhew, 750 F.3d 61 (1st Cir.
2014) (same); Korab v. Fink, 748 F.3d 875 (9th Cir. 2014) (same).
209. See generally Soskin, 353 F.3d at 1250–54; Bruns, 750 F.3d at 69–70;
Korab, 797 F.3d at 581.
210. See 8 U.S.C. § 1641(b) (2012) (limiting the term “qualified alien”).
Congress deemed persons lawfully admitted for permanent residence and other
specified groups, such as asylees and refugees, to be “qualified aliens.” All
persons not considered to be “qualified aliens,” such as undocumented
immigrants, were deemed “unqualified” and thus ineligible for most federal
benefits. Id. § 1611(a). Congress then parsed immigrants’ eligibility for federal
means-tested benefits even further, dividing “qualified aliens” into two
additional subgroups: those lawfully residing in the United States before August
22, 1996, some of whom could receive federal benefits, and those who arrived
lawfully in the United States after that date, for whom federal benefits would be
unavailable for at least five years. Id. § 1613(a).
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permanent residents ineligible for federal food stamps and
Medicaid until they have possessed that status for at least five
years. 211 In doing so, Congress identified two federal interests
sought to be furthered by PRWORA—promoting self-sufficiency
among aliens in accordance with “national immigration policy”
and reducing “the incentive for illegal immigration provided by
the availability of public benefits.” 212 PRWORA did not, however,
direct a particular state practice with respect to state-funded
benefits.
On the contrary, Congress expressly allowed the states to
decide for themselves whether to direct their own monies for that
purpose and yet tried to insulate the states from the
requirements of equal protection, and apparently Graham, should
they choose to follow the federal government’s lead and deny
immigrants an equal share of state resources. 213 In § 1601(7) of
PRWORA, a provision with dubious legitimacy in so far as its
attempt to legislate the outcome of an equal protection
analysis, 214 Congress provided: “a State that chooses to follow the
Federal classification in determining the eligibility of such aliens
for public assistance shall be considered to have chosen the least
restrictive means available for achieving the compelling
governmental interest of assuring that aliens be self-reliant in
accordance with national immigration policy.” 215
Even without finding § 1601(7) dispositive, courts have relied
upon PRWORA to shape a new equal protection jurisprudence in
the lower courts sanctioning state discrimination against
immigrants in the realm of public benefit access. Some courts
have viewed PRWORA’s sanctioning of state denials of benefits as
dispositive of the legality of state law under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 216 Other courts have attributed to federal law the
211. Id.
212. Id. § 1601(5)–(6).
213. Id. § 1622(a).
214. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (concluding it is
exclusively for the Court, and not Congress, “to determine what constitutes a
constitutional violation”).
215. 8 U.S.C. § 1601(7) (2012).
216. As the Ninth Circuit put it in Korab v. Fink, 797 F.3d 572 (9th Cir.
2014): “Even assuming arguendo that Hawaii’s discretionary decision not to
provide optional coverage for COFA Residents constitutes alienage-based
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inequality experienced by immigrants, even with respect to state
resources, absolving states of any responsibility for funding half
of citizens’ federally-subsidized benefits, while not providing
equivalent funding to immigrants. 217 And still others have viewed
state legislation targeting immigrants for denial of healthcare
benefits as classifications crafted in accordance with the
monetary incentives of following the federal government’s
discriminatory lead, and therefore based upon characteristics
other than alienage status. 218
The below summary examines the various roles that
federalism has played in this recent equal protection
jurisprudence. It exposes and critiques the sometimes
unacknowledged power of federalism concerns to trump
immigrants’ rights to equal protection before the states.
A. Congressionally Authorized Discrimination
In cases arising under the Supremacy Clause, courts focus
upon congressional intent because “the purpose of Congress is the
ultimate touchstone in every preemption case.” 219 That is, courts
must consider whether Congress intended to occupy a field of
regulation, the reach and meaning of its statutes, and whether its
intent would be frustrated by state laws addressed to the same
topic. 220 The same is typically not true when evaluating the
discrimination, that decision, which is indisputably authorized by the Welfare
Reform Act, is subject to rational-basis review. The posture of Korab’s
constitutional challenge—essentially a complaint about state spending—coupled
with the legitimacy of the federal statutory framework, leads to this conclusion.”
Id. at 582.
217. See generally Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1948); see also Soskin v.
Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242, 1255–56 (10th Cir. 2004) (stating “the discrimination
is Congress’s doing”).
218. See Bruns v. Mayhew, 750 F.3d 61, 71 (1st Cir. 2014) (concluding that
“the state drew no distinctions on the basis of alienage” when it opted to
participate in Medicaid and provide half of the program’s funding, without
affording equivalent state resources to lawful permanent residents).
219. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v.
Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485, (1996)).
220. See generally Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012)
(analyzing congressional intent under doctrines of express, field, and conflict
preemption and invaliding portions of Arizona law addressed to immigration
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validity of state laws regulating migrants under the Equal
Protection Clause. Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated,
including in Graham, that Congress cannot insulate the states
from the requirements of equal protection. 221 And in Plyler, the
Supreme Court recognized that congressional choices are not
dispositive of states’ equal protection obligations even with
respect to the rights of undocumented immigrants. 222
Nevertheless, after PRWORA, a number of courts grappling with
the “the effect of Congressional authorization of state
discrimination against aliens,” have viewed the effect of
PRWORA as effectively altering states’ Fourteenth Amendment
obligations to legal permanent residents.
Specifically, in Soskin, the Tenth Circuit deemed PRWORA
as dispositive of the constitutional inquiry, 223 in contravention of
Graham’s recognition that Congress may not authorize a state’s
discrimination or immunize the state from the requirements of
enforcement); Gilbert, supra note 176, at 159 (describing the various forms of
federal preemption and the role of congressional intent).
221. Specifically, in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), the Court
concluded that a congressional statute that purported to authorize state laws
imposing durational residency requirements for welfare benefits was irrelevant
to whether state laws adopting such restrictions violated equal protection.
Reasoning that it was not the congressional enactment, “but only the state
requirements which pose the constitutional question,” the Court concluded that
“Congress may not authorize the States to violate the Equal Protection Clause.”
Id. at 641. Two years later, the Court reaffirmed that principle in Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), rejecting Arizona’s argument that its
durational residency requirement for immigrants was constitutional because it
was “actually authorized by federal law.” Id. at 380. The Court noted that even
if the federal statute were “read so as to authorize discriminatory treatment of
aliens at the option of the States . . . serious constitutional questions [would be]
presented.” Id. at 381–82. The Court explained that although the Federal
Government has broad power with respect to immigration, “Congress does not
have the power to authorize the individual States to violate the Equal
Protection Clause.” Id. (citing Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 641).
222. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 224 (quoting Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n,
334 U.S. 410, 420 (1948). The Court reasoned that congressional “disapproval of
the presence of these children within the United States, and the evasion of the
federal regulatory program that is the mark of undocumented status” did not
provide Texas with “authority for its decision to impose upon them special
disabilities.” Id.
223. Id. at 1254–55.
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equal protection. 224 Indeed, the Tenth Circuit described that
statement in Graham as a “tautological” proposition. 225 In the
court’s view, the question was “not whether Congress can
authorize such a constitutional violation,” but rather “what
constitutes such a violation when Congress has (clearly)
expressed its will regarding a matter relating to aliens.” 226 The
Tenth Circuit concluded that Congress’s invitation to the states
in PRWORA to deny benefits to lawful residents reflected an
expression of congressional will regarding “national policy.” 227
The Court explained that when a state determines that the
burden of providing benefits to lawful residence “is too high,”
such that it opts to deny such coverage, “it is addressing the
congressional concern (not just a parochial state concern) that
‘individual aliens not burden the public benefits system.’” 228 The
First and Ninth Circuits followed Soskin’s lead and adopted this
reasoning as well. 229
These decisions reflect a congressional imprimatur theory of
state alienage discrimination. But there are important reasons
why Congress cannot immunize state discrimination against a
suspect class in this way through its own immigration policy
decisions—that is, who may enter and remain within the United
States. It would suggest that Congress can serve as the
gatekeeper to constitutional rights, determining the beneficiaries
224. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 382 (1971) (“Congress does
not have the power to authorize the individual States to violate the Equal
Protection Clause.” (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641 (1969))); see
also Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 508 (1999) (“Congress has no affirmative power
to authorize the States to violate the Fourteenth Amendment and is implicitly
prohibited from passing legislation that purports to validate any such
violation.”).
225. Soskin v. Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242, 1255 (10th Cir. 2004).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229 See generally Bruns v. Mayhew, 750 F.3d 61 (2014); see also Korab v.
Fink, 748 F.3d 875, 887 (9th Cir. 2014) (concluding that Congress in PRWORA
“has (clearly) expressed its will regarding a matter relating to aliens,” such that
Hawaii did not violate equal protection by “merely following the federal
direction set forth by Congress under the Welfare Reform Act” (quoting Soskin,
353 F.3d at 1254)).
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of such rights, all subject to change should new political leaders
change course.
Under preemption doctrine, the law deemed supreme
depends upon what law is in force on the day of a court’s decision.
But the Constitution “removes certain norms from the realm of
ordinary politics.” 230 The Fourteenth Amendment aimed to check
majoritarian power for the benefit of vulnerable groups and its
norm of equal treatment therefore transcends the indeterminacy
of politics. 231
B. Structured Discrimination: “Aliens Only” Programs
In evaluating whether state alienage classifications violate
equal protection guarantees, a number of courts have also focused
on whether the state has allocated public resources to citizens
and aliens through separately named, funded, and structured
programs. Under this approach, states do not run afoul of equal
protection if they provide resources to citizen and immigrants
through separate programs (some of which may be jointly funded
by the federal government) and then simply terminate the
“alien-only” program.
For example, in Doe v. Commissioner of Transitional
Assistance, 232 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held
that a six-month durational residency requirement for a state
supplemental benefit program imposed upon immigrants
ineligible for federal Transitional Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (TAFDC) did not violate equal protection. In the Court’s
view, the imposition of a durational residency requirement
uniquely upon immigrants did not unconstitutionally distinguish
between citizens and immigrants because “the Massachusetts

230. See David R. Dow, The Equal Protection Clause and the Legislative
Redistricting Cases—Some Notes Concerning the Standing of White Plaintiffs,
81 MINN. L. REV. 1123, 1134–35 (1997) (describing equal protection guarantees
as “constraints on the political majority's political power”).
231. Id. at 1134.
232. 773 N.E.2d 404, 410 (Mass. 2002) (applying rational basis review to
Massachusetts’s alienage-based denial of public benefits).
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Legislature was not required to establish the supplemental
program” and only immigrants were eligible for it. 233
The court rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that the State
had treated immigrants and citizens differently by partly
financing the jointly funded TAFDC program but not providing
similar benefits to immigrants on the same terms. 234 It reasoned
that citizens were “eligible to receive benefits from a different”
federal program “on conditions less restrictive than those
imposed on qualified aliens” due to federal policies and thus this
factor was irrelevant to whether the state had enacted a
discriminatory classification targeting immigrants. 235 The court
applied rational basis review to the state’s durational residency
requirement, noting that the state’s choice to provide a separate
“aliens-only” program evidenced a “clearly noninvidious intent,”
namely, “mitigating the harm to qualified alien families”
occasioned by the Welfare Reform Act. 236
The Connecticut Supreme Court employed similar reasoning
in Hong Pham v. Starkowski, 237 holding that the elimination of a
state-funded medical assistance program for immigrants
ineligible for Federal Medicaid did not “discriminate on the basis
of alienage” where the eliminated “aliens only” program did “not
benefit citizens as opposed to aliens.” 238 The court rejected the
plaintiffs’ argument that the state’s decision to participate in the
Federal Medicaid program and to thereby allocate state resources
to fund 50% of that program for citizens without allocating
equivalent funding to immigrants constituted differential
treatment for purposes of equal protection. 239 The court reasoned
that the state’s treatment of immigrants under an exclusively
state-funded program was not comparable to “the state’s
233. Id. at 411–15.
234. Id. at 414–15.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. 16 A.3d 635 (Conn. 2011).
238. See id. at 645–48 (“When a state establishes an assistance program
that benefits only aliens, the elimination of that program does not violate the
Equal Protection Clause simply because the state is taking a benefit away from
aliens.”).
239. Id. at 639–41.
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treatment of individuals within the separate federal Medicaid
program, which is governed and funded substantially by a
different government.” 240
The court distinguished Graham and the state court
decisions that have followed it post-PRWORA on grounds that the
programs at issue involved discrimination “within a single, state
funded and state controlled program” providing benefits to aliens
and citizens alike. 241 The court held that Connecticut therefore
did not discriminate on the basis of alienage and declined to
reach what level of scrutiny should apply to such classifications
“authorized by the federal government.” 242
Similarly, in Bruns v. Mayhew, 243 the First Circuit rejected
the plaintiffs’ equal protection challenge to the state’s
termination of their state-funded medical assistance on grounds
that the plaintiffs were not similarly situated to any other
recipients of state funding, even though Maine administered a
single state medical assistance program, MaineCare, that
distributed both Federal Medicaid and exclusively state-funded
benefits to lawful permanent residents ineligible for that federal
program. 244 The state’s joint administration of the two programs
under the same umbrella program and the state’s funding of half
of citizens’ federal Medicaid benefits did not alter the court’s view
that the state’s repeal of the “aliens only” portion of that program
did not deprive lawful immigrants “of a benefit that it continued
to provide to citizens.” 245
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Pimentel v.
Dreyfus, 246 applied similar reasoning, although the federal
program at issue, unlike those in Doe, Hong Pham, and Bruns,
240. See id. at 655 (reasoning that programs solely sponsored by the state
are not comparable to programs with joint federal and state funding).
241. Id.
242. Id. at 645, 655.
243. See Bruns v. Mayhew, 750 F.3d 61, 70 (1st Cir. 2014) (reasoning that
when Maine repealed the state program it did not continue to give citizens
benefits that non-citizens no longer received).
244. Id. at 69–70.
245. See id. (reasoning that, though the programs are under the same
“umbrella,” they are distinct because one is jointly funded by the federal
government and the state, and the other program is exclusively state-funded).
246. 670 F.3d 1096, 1108 (9th Cir. 2012).
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was not jointly funded by the state and federal government.
Specifically, the court held that Washington’s termination of an
exclusively state-funded food assistance program for immigrants
who were ineligible for federal food stamp benefits did not violate
equal protection. 247 Citing the different funding sources, and
federal control over the eligibility criteria for the federal benefits,
the court reasoned that the affected immigrants were not
similarly situated to citizens eligible for federal Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits. 248
In so holding, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that
the state’s expenditure of 50% of the administrative costs for the
federally funded SNAP program without providing equivalent
resources to immigrants constituted an impermissible
classification on the basis of alienage. 249 Indeed, the court opined
that Washington’s “alien’s only” benefits program might present a
case of reverse alienage discrimination, because the only relevant
alienage classification at issue actually benefited immigrants; the
state provided “no similar state program for citizens.” 250 The
court concluded that when a state repeals a law designed to level

247. See id. at 1109–10 (“When Washington terminated FAP, the state
denied the plaintiff class benefits that it did not and still does not grant to
citizens and other aliens. Thus, the difficulty with Pimentel’s claim is that she
offers no similarly situated individuals as a foundation for her equal protection
claim.”).
248. See id. at 1107 (“Since the recipients under the different programs are
therefore not similarly situated, Pimentel may not compare former FAP
recipients to current SNAP recipients to allege an equal protection violation.”).
249. Id. at 1108. Other federal courts have likewise ruled that state
administration of federal welfare programs does not alter the deferential
scrutiny applicable to PRWORA’s alienage eligibility restrictions for federal
benefits. See Lewis v. Thompson, 252 F.3d 567, 582 (2d Cir. 2001) (explaining
that state administration of a program providing pre-natal Medicaid benefits
did not alter the rational basis review applicable to federal alienage
restrictions); accord Aleman v. Glickman, 217 F.3d 1191, 1197 (9th Cir. 2000)
(same as to Food Stamps); City of Chi. (Alvarez) v. Shalala, 189 F.3d 598, 600–
05 (7th Cir. 1999) (same as to SSI and food stamps); Rodriguez v. United States,
169 F.3d 1342, 1346–51 (11th Cir. 1999) (same).
250. Pimentel v. Dreyfus, 670 F.3d 1096, 1107 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting
Adarand Constrs. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (“[R]ejecting the notion of
‘benign classifications’ and applying strict scrutiny to all racial classifications
irrespective of the race of the burdened or benefitted group.”)).

138

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 77 (2016)

the playing field occasioned by Congress’s discrimination against
aliens “it does not necessarily engage in discrimination.” 251
The Ninth Circuit at least recognized the theoretical problem
of resolving equal protection disputes by an overly formal
analysis of benefit programs’ structure. 252 The court noted,
“Washington could not evade strict scrutiny simply by first
authorizing one state-funded program for citizens and certain
aliens and another for a subclass of aliens, and then canceling the
latter.” 253 But in the case of federal SNAP benefits, however, the
court viewed the comparison between federal food stamp benefits
and state-funded food assistance as “faulty” because, irrespective
of the fact that the state administered the federally funded SNAP
benefits in the same program as the separately funded
aliens-only program, “the two programs are, in reality, two
separately administered programs funded by two distinct
sovereigns.” 254 For that reason, the court concluded that
recipients of the terminated aliens-only state program were not
similarly situated to citizens eligible for the SNAP program. 255
These varied decisions turning back equal protection
challenges to states’ unequal allocation of state resources to legal
residents and citizens illustrate courts’ tendency to view such
issues with a formalism that insufficiently probes state
responsibility for immigrants’ unequal treatment, and instead
disproportionately
credits
congressional
immigration
prerogatives with the resulting inequality.
To be sure, no theory or principle of federalism supports
ratcheting down the scrutiny applicable to a suspect class merely
because it is less convenient or more expensive for the states to
provide equal treatment due to factors beyond that sovereign’s
control. As the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has
stated, that federal policy choices makes discrimination against
251. Id. (quoting Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 483
(1982) (“To be sure, the simple repeal or modification of desegregation or
antidiscrimination laws, without more, never has been viewed as embodying a
presumptively invalid racial classification.”)).
252. Id. at 1006–07.
253. Id. at 1106.
254. Id. at 1107.
255. Id. at 1106–10.
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noncitizens more cost-effective for the state should make no
difference. 256
The claim that federal immigration policy renders
immigrants dissimilarly situated from citizens in this context is
also inconsistent with Graham’s theory of equality. For example,
one might argue that citizens and aliens are not similarly
situated vis a vis the states in light of their status under federal
law, which makes citizens eligible for federal Medicaid matching
funds without the same restrictions it imposes upon lawful
permanent residents. But Graham treated citizens and lawful
permanent residents similarly situated based upon their shared
contributions and burdens of community membership, 257 not a
comparative economic assessment of what it would cost to treat
them equally. 258
C. Alienage Classifications Recast
Relatedly, courts have treated alienage-based restrictions on
public benefits as classifications based upon characteristics other
than alienage status. 259 For example, in addition to upholding
Connecticut’s denial of state-funded healthcare benefits to
immigrants on grounds that the elimination of an “aliens only”
benefit program did not constitute alienage discrimination, the
256. See Finch v. Commonwealth Health Ins. Connector Auth. (Finch I), 946
N.E.2d 1262, 1280 (Mass. 2011) (stating “that the Federal government (on
national origin grounds) is unwilling to [finance] Commonwealth Care does not
render the Commonwealth obligated to classify eligibility on the basis of
national origin—it merely makes such a classification economically attractive to
the State that is left carrying the entire burden”).
257. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1971).
258. See Korab v. Fink, 797 F.3d 572, 583 (9th Cir. 2014) (concluding that
Hawaii did not engage in alienage discrimination where the plaintiff had not
“even alleged that the state expenditures for health insurance for aliens within
the discretionary category created by Congress are less than the state
expenditures for health insurance for others”). But see id. at 599–600 (Clifton,
J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for requiring equal protection claimants to
“demonstrate that the state [spends] less funds [per capita] than it [spends] on
the rest of the population” as inconsistent with “bedrock equal protection
doctrine” which does not excuse disparate treatment because it is “more
expensive” to provide equivalent benefits to similarly situated groups of state
residents).
259. Hong Pham v. Starkowski, 16 A.3d 635, 662–63 (Haw. 2011).
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Hong Pham court also reasoned that Connecticut’s denial of
healthcare funding to immigrants was at most a classification
“based on an individual’s eligibility for federal Medicaid”
matching funds, and not alienage status. 260
The First Circuit in Bruns v. Mayhew 261 adopted similar
reasoning, refusing to view Maine’s denial of state-funded
medical assistance to lawful permanent residents ineligible for
federal Medicaid as alienage discrimination. 262 The court
reasoned that “if Maine can be said to have ‘discriminated’ at all”
by continuing to participate in the Federal Medicaid program, “it
only did so on the basis of federal Medicaid eligibility, a benign
classification subject to mere rational basis review.” 263
This analysis inadequately accounts for the state’s role in
immigrants’ unequal treatment. To be sure, the federal
government is responsible for the exclusion of immigrants from
the Federal Medicaid program. 264 Under the Supreme Court’s
precedents, the federal government’s authority over immigration
matters justifies that unequal treatment. 265 But the same
260. See id. at 659 (reasoning that “[w]hen the state participates in federal
Medicaid, it chooses to provide some state funding to assist [eligible]
individuals . . . and not to provide funding to [ineligible] individuals” and
immigrants are “not the only group of individuals ineligible for federal
Medicaid”).
261. 750 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 2014).
262. Id. at 69–70.
263. Id. (citing Hong Pham, 16 A.3d at 659); cf. Soskin v. Reinertson, 353
F.3d 1242, 1255–56 (10th Cir. 2004).
264. Soskin employed similar reasoning. See 353 F.3d at 1255–56 (“A state’s
exercise of the option to include fewer aliens in its aliens-only program, then,
should not be treated as discrimination against aliens as compared to citizens.
That aspect of the discrimination is Congress’s doing—by creating one program
for citizens and a separate one for aliens.”).
265. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 85 (1975) (“[A] division by a State of
the category of persons who are not citizens of that State into subcategories of
United States citizens and aliens has no apparent justification, whereas, a
comparable classification by the Federal Government is a routine and normally
legitimate part of its business.”); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982)
(“Although it is a routine and normally legitimate part of the business of the
Federal Government to classify on the basis of alien status, and to take into
account the character of the relationship between the alien and this country,
only rarely are such matters relevant to legislation by a State.” (quotation
omitted)).

THE PREEMPTING OF EQUAL PROTECTION

141

justification does not apply to the states. And thus it is hard to
see why—at least on the courts’ articulated theory—a state
deserves a pass from its equal protections obligations where it
opts into a discriminatory scheme on its own accord (albeit with
significant financial incentives to do so), is complicit in unequal
treatment, but does not possess the same authority for treating
migrants dissimilarly as the federal government. 266 In a state like
Connecticut, for example, the government chose to extend $1.9
billion of funds from state tax coffers into the Federal
Government’s discriminatory scheme, without extending resident
immigrants equal resources for healthcare benefits. 267 Indeed, the
courts’ characterization of the classification as “eligibility for
federal matching funds” conflates the fiscal benefits to the states
of singling out immigrants for termination of welfare benefits
with the threshold question of whether the state has drawn an
alienage-based classification by funding benefits for citizens but
not migrants.
Courts’ willingness to view states’ discriminatory spending
on healthcare benefits as benign classifications based upon the
availability of federal matching funds is probably best explained
by judges’ unstated intuition that it seems unreasonable to hold
the federal government to one standard, but then expect fairer
treatment from the states with respect to the same kind of public
benefits. 268 But that intuition is in direct opposition to the
longstanding rationale of the equal protection dichotomy. This
strand of the new equal protection jurisprudence involving
alienage status thus exposes a burgeoning break down of what
once appeared to be well-settled doctrinal silos of federal and
state alienage classifications.
***
Under each of these approaches, the supplanting of
Fourteenth Amendment antidiscrimination norms with a
266. Supra note 265.
267. Hong Pham v. Starkowski, 16 A.3d 635, 644–45 (Haw. 2011).
268. The Ninth Circuit followed this rationale in Korab v. Fink, which
reasoned that “[t]he logical corollary to the national policy that Congress set out
in the Welfare Reform Act is that, where the federal program is constitutional,
as it is here, states cannot be forced to replace the federal funding Congress has
removed.” 797 F.3d 572, 582 (9th Cir. 2014).
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doctrine disproportionately focused on congressional policy
undermines Graham’s promise of equal treatment by the states.
Or, more simply, it signals a preempting of equal protection for
immigrants.
A number of courts, however, have rejected these approaches
and, post-PRWORA, followed Graham’s mandate to apply strict
scrutiny to state alienage classifications. 269 Significantly, courts
have invalidated state laws both denying immigrants access to
exclusively state-funded programs that previously benefitted
noncitizens and citizens alike, 270 and laws eliminating exclusively
state-funded “aliens-only” programs where the state continued to
partly fund federal benefits for citizens. 271
For example, in Aliessa v. Novello, 272 in holding that New
York’s termination of state-funded medical benefits to lawfully
present immigrants based upon their immigration status violated
the equal protection guarantees of the New York and federal
constitutions, the New York Court of Appeals rejected the state’s
claim that New York’s decision to terminate certain legal
residents from the program implemented federal immigration
policy and should thus “be evaluated under the less stringent
‘rational basis’ standard.” The court recognized that if Congress
specifically directed “the States to implement national
immigration objectives” in a uniform manner, a state alienage
classification might be properly considered under rational basis
review because “the Constitution empowers Congress to ‘establish
[a] uniform Rule of Naturalization.’” 273 But in the court’s view,
269. See Finch v. Commonwealth Health Ins. Connector Auth. (Finch II),
959 N.E.2d 970, 981 (Mass. 2012) (stating that the Commonwealth may not
“lean on Federal policy as a crutch to absolve it of examining whether its own
invidious discrimination is truly necessary”); Finch v. Commonwealth Health
Ins. Connector Auth. (Finch I), 946 N.E.2d 1262, 1280 (Mass. 2011) (applying
strict scrutiny to the state’s benefits program).
270. See Aliessa v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085, 1098 (N.Y. 2001) (striking
down New York’s alienage-based allocation of exclusively state-funded
healthcare benefits).
271. See Ehrlich v. Perez, 908 A.2d 1220, 1227 (Md. 2006) (striking down
Maryland’s termination of exclusively state-funded health care benefits for
immigrants ineligible for federal benefits, while continuing to jointly fund
federal benefits for citizens).
272. 754 N.E.2d 1085 (N.Y. 2001).
273. Id. at 1096 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 and Plyler v. Doe, 457
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PRWORA did not constitute a uniform rule of federal
immigration policy because it authorized states to choose for
themselves whether to provide state-funded benefits to
immigrants, thereby inviting “potentially wide variation” in state
practice. 274
In Ehrlich v. Perez 275 and Finch v. Commonwealth Health
Ins. Connector Auth., 276 the highest courts of Maryland and
Massachusetts concluded that the respective states violated equal
protection where they allocated resources to fund federal
Medicaid benefits for citizens and lawful residents who satisfied
PRWORA’s five year bar but terminated state healthcare benefits
for certain legal residents ineligible for federal Medicaid by virtue
of their immigration status. The courts found equal protection
violations where the differential treatment challenged by the
plaintiffs consisted of the states financing part of federally
subsidized benefits for citizens while eliminating a supplemental,
exclusively state-funded “aliens only” program. 277 Both decisions
thus eschewed a formalistic analysis of the states’ equal
U.S. 202, 219 n.19 (1982)).
274. See id. at 1098 (“If the rule were uniform, each State would carry out
the same policy under the mandate of Congress—the only body with authority to
set immigration policy.”). Unlike the other recent cases in which courts have
upheld state laws excluding legal residents from public benefits programs, the
program at issue in Aliessa provided exclusively state-funded coverage to both
citizens and aliens alike who did not qualify for Federal Medicaid. Id. at 1092.
As a result, the differential treatment challenged by the plaintiffs could not be
dismissed as the result of a separate, federally directed program, and New
York’s classification ran directly afoul of Graham. Cf. Krhapunskiy v. Doar, 909
N.E.2d 70, 76–77 (N.Y. 2009) (concluding New York’s failure to provide state
funding to ameliorate the effects of PRWORA did not violate the requirement of
equal protection). While Aliessa might, therefore, be dismissed as the most
straightforward application of Graham post-PRWORA, other state courts have
not cabined its reasoning to exclusively stated-funded benefit programs.
Ehrlich, 908 A.2d at 1227.
275. 908 A. 2d 1220, 1243–44 (Md. 2006).
276. Finch II, 959 N.E.2d 970, 973 (Mass. 2012); Finch I, 946 N.E.2d 1262,
1280 (Mass. 2011).
277. See Ehrlich, 908 A.2d at 1227 (“Although the Maryland State Medicaid
program, along with federal funds, provides the same medical services as
available under the Welfare Innovation Act to both citizens and
residents, . . . this new provision is limited to those aliens for whom federal
Medicaid eligibility was eliminated by the Welfare Reform Act.”).
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protection obligations and instead focused on the state’s decision
to partially fund benefits for citizens through federal programs
while eliminating funding for lawful permanent residents
through separate state programs and appropriations.
D. Lawfully Present Without Equality
Another fault-line where federalism considerations are
casting a long shadow in equal protection jurisprudence involves
the rights of lawfully present non-immigrants to equal treatment
by the states. While there is currently consensus among three
federal courts of appeals that rational basis review should apply
to state laws denying public benefits to lawful permanent
residents after PRWORA, the circuits are split as to whether
Graham mandates strict scrutiny when states enact laws limiting
nonimmigrants’ 278 access to employment opportunities, drivers’
licenses, and professional licenses. 279 In spite of the divergent
outcomes, like the PRWORA cases, here too, federalism concerns
have dominated the equal protection discussion.
Specifically, the Second Circuit and Fifth Circuit disagree
about whether strict scrutiny under Graham applies to laws that
discriminate against temporary, but lawfully present,
non-immigrants. 280 In LeClerc v. Webb, 281 the Fifth Circuit upheld
278. Immigration law classifies migrants as immigrants (those admitted for
permanent residence) and nonimmigrants who “are admitted to the United
States only for the duration of their status” and must state “they have ‘no
intention of abandoning’ their countries of origin and do not intend to seek
permanent residence in the United States.” LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 418–
19 (5th Cir. 2005).
279. Compare id. at 420 (applying rational basis review to uphold Louisiana
law barring nonimmigrants from taking the bar exam), and LULAC v.
Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 535–36 (6th Cir. 2007) (applying rational basis review
to Tennessee law barring nonimmigrants from obtaining driver licenses), with
Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66, 75 (2d Cir. 2012) (rejecting “the rationale of
the Fifth and Sixth Circuits” and applying strict scrutiny to Connecticut law
excluding nonimmigrants from being pharmacists).
280. Supra note 279.
281. See 419 F.3d at 417–18 (distinguishing lawful permanent residents
from nonimmigrants, stating that unlike the former, nonimmigrants are not
“legally entrenched within American society” given their short term permission
to remain and need not be recognized as a discrete and insular minority).
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a Louisiana Supreme Court rule rendering lawfully present
graduates of foreign law schools—many here on temporary
worker and student visas—ineligible to take the Louisiana Bar
exam in the face of an equal protection challenge. The court held
that rational basis review applied to Louisiana’s citizenship
eligibility requirement for the bar exam because Graham and a
later Supreme Court decision, In re Griffiths, 282 were not
controlling. 283 In re Griffiths applied Graham and held that
Connecticut’s exclusion of lawful permanent residents from bar
admissions violated the requirements of equal protection. 284
Departing from those precedents, the Fifth Circuit reasoned
that the Constitution imposes different equal protection
obligations upon the states with respect to lawful permanent
residents and temporary, but also lawfully present, foreign
residents. 285
The court reasoned that the U. S. Supreme Court has never
strictly scrutinized a state alienage classification other than
those disadvantaging lawful permanent residents. 286 And in the
Fifth Circuit’s view, the Court in Griffiths emphasized that
lawful permanent residents “share essential benefits and
burdens of citizenship in a way that aliens with lesser legal
status do not.” 287 It noted that, in addressing equal protection
challenges to state laws burdening other classes of immigrants,
including non-immigrant aliens or undocumented immigrants,
“the Court has either foregone Equal Protection analysis”
282. See 413 U.S. 717, 726–27 (1973) (applying strict scrutiny and striking
down under the Equal Protection Clause a Connecticut law barring lawful
permanent residents from taking the bar exam).
283. See LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 418–19 (5th Cir. 2005) (reasoning
that In re Griffiths’ rationale was limited to resident aliens, and did not apply to
nonimmigrants).
284. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. at 726–27.
285. See LaClerc, 419 F.3d at 410 (noting that “the level of constitutional
protection afforded nonimmigrant aliens is different from that possessed by
permanent resident aliens”).
286. See id. at 415–16 (stating that “the Supreme Court has reviewed with
strict scrutiny only state laws affecting permanent resident aliens” and has held
that “‘not all limitations on aliens are suspect’” (quoting Foley v. Connelie, 435
U.S. 291, 294 (1978))).
287. Id. at 415.
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altogether, as in Toll v. Moreno, 288 and De Canas v. Bica, 289
which both addressed state alienage laws solely under the
Supremacy Clause, or applied “a modified rational basis review,”
as in Plyler v. Doe. 290
Federalism, specifically a rights-enhancing theory of federal
immigration policy, was central to the Fifth Circuit’s
reasoning. 291 The court noted that the Supreme Court’s
“fundamental rationale” for applying strict scrutiny to state laws
affecting lawful permanent residents was a structural one: that
the states “‘took position[s] seemingly inconsistent with the
congressional determination to admit the alien to permanent
residence.’” 292 The court suggested that the same conflict with
federal immigration policy is not at stake when states regulate
non-immigrants, who do not benefit from the same rightsenhancing offer of permanent residence. 293
LeClerc further reasoned that the Supreme Court applied
strict scrutiny to state laws classifying on the basis of alienage
status in part based upon permanent residents’ political
powerlessness and similarity to citizens. 294 In the court’s view,
nonimmigrants lack this same peculiar position that juxtaposes
vulnerability with rights and responsibilities. 295 The Fifth Circuit
288. See 458 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1982) (invalidating a University of Maryland
policy denying in-state tuition to nonimmigrants on Supremacy Clause grounds,
after declining to consider the plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claims).
289. See 424 U.S. 351, 356–57 (1976) (upholding a California law prohibiting
employment of undocumented workers on Supremacy Clause grounds).
290. See LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 416 (5th Cir. 2005) (noting that in
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 224 (1982), the Court concluded that the “the
immigration status of the affected class of aliens precluded use of either
intermediate or strict scrutiny review”).
291. Id. at 423–25.
292. Id. (quoting Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 295 (1978)).
293. Id.
294. Id. at 417–18.
295. See id. (reasoning that because of their temporary status,
nonimmigrant aliens lack a similar connection to American society, as evidenced
by the requirement that they stipulate before entry that they do not intend to
abandon their native citizenship). Moreover, the court found that as a class
nonimmigrants are not discrete or insular because wide variation exists among
nonimmigrants’ admission status. Id. at 417. In his dissent, Judge Stewart took
issue with this reasoning, contending that the Court’s decisions in Graham and
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reaffirmed its holding in LeClerc six years later in Van Staden v.
St. Martin, 296 applying rational basis review and upholding a
Louisiana statute that made lawfully present non-immigrants
ineligible to work as licensed practical nurses. 297
In LULAC v. Bredsen298 the Sixth Circuit closely followed the
Fifth Circuit’s approach in a case challenging Tennessee’s denial
of drivers’ licenses to lawfully present non-citizens. 299 The court
applied rational basis review, citing the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning
that Graham does not apply beyond the class of lawful
permanent residents and that temporary, nonpermanent
residents are dissimilar from citizens in constitutionally
significant ways. 300
In addition, the court cited the Fifth Circuit’s federalism
justification for cabining Graham and its progeny to lawful
permanent residents, noting that when states discriminate
against LPRs they are taking a position “seemingly inconsistent
with the congressional determination to admit the alien to
permanent residence.” 301 But the Sixth Circuit added an
additional structural justification for applying a more deferential
its progeny apply to all lawfully present “aliens” as a class and strict scrutiny
did not turn on “aliens’ ability to serve in the Armed Forces or pay taxes.” Id. at
428–29.
296. 664 F.3d 56 (2011).
297. See id. at 61 (accepting as a rational justification for the law that it
“seeks to protect Louisiana residents from LPN’s who may have previously left
the jurisdiction to avoid the Board's disciplinary controls on the profession”).
298. 500 F.3d 523 (2007).
299. See id. at 523–33 (agreeing with the Fifth Circuit’s distinction between
permanent resident aliens who are “legally entrenched in society” and
nonimmigrant aliens who are admitted to the United States for a durational
period).
300. Id. at 533. As in LeClerc, LULAC included a strong dissent. Circuit
Judge Ronald Lee Gilman criticized the majority for failing to acknowledge the
extensive criticism of the LeClerc opinion, including dissents from both the
initial appellate decision and the narrow 8–7 decision declining en banc review.
LULAC, 500 F.3d at 539–42 (Gilman, J., dissenting). He further chided the
majority for treating the absence of Supreme Court precedent extending
Graham to nonimmigrants as a reason to read that decision’s clear holding
declaring aliens a suspect class in a narrow manner. Id. at 542–43.
301. Id. at 533 (majority opinion) (quoting LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405,
417 (5th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted)).
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scrutiny to laws discriminating on the basis of nonimmigrant
status: In the court’s view, Tennessee’s law not only was
consistent with federal law, it actually “mirrors it.” 302 The court
explained that the challenged law “merely serves to deny stateissued proof of identification to any alien whose presence the
federal government has refrained from permanently authorizing,
so as to avoid the appearance that the State of Tennessee is
vouching for his or her identity.” 303 In fact, the court
characterized the state’s classification as “directly derivative of
aliens’ status under immigration law.” 304 The court was candid
that federalism concerns were significant to its reasoning, noting,
in response to the dissent, that its “more deferential approach to
Tennessee’s legislative judgment” was “born of due respect for
principles of federalism and comity.” 305
The Second Circuit, also emphasizing principles of
federalism, reached the opposite result in Dandamudi v. Tisch. 306
There, the court deemed Graham controlling and applied strict
scrutiny to invalidate a New York law that made lawful
permanent resident status or citizenship a requirement to work
as a pharmacist within that state, thereby excluding lawfully
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. See id. at 534 (describing how the state law was the “mirror image” of
federal law).
305. Id. at 534 n.8. In another case involving lawfully present immigrants’
access to drivers’ licenses, Arizona Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer, 757 F.3d
1053 (2014), the Ninth Circuit avoided deciding what level of scrutiny applies to
state classifications targeting recipients of work authorization pursuant to
President Obama’s Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program,
agreeing with the lower court that Arizona’s decision to deny DACA recipients
drivers’ licenses was “likely to fail even rational basis review.” Id. at 1065. The
Ninth Circuit, however characterized the Supreme Court precedent as not
limiting strict scrutiny to lawful permanent residents. Rather, the court noted
that “the Supreme Court has consistently required the application of strict
scrutiny to state action that discriminates against noncitizens authorized to be
present in the United States.” Id. at 1065 n.4 (citing Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432
U.S. 1 (1977); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Takahashi v. Fish &
Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948)).
306. See Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66, 78 (2012) (“We see no reason to
create an exception to the Supreme Court’s precedent that would result in such
illogical results that clearly contradict the federal government’s determination
as to which individuals have a legal right to be here.”).
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present non-immigrants like the plaintiff. 307 The court declined to
view Graham and its progeny as limited to lawful permanent
residents, reasoning that the Supreme Court affirmed a “general
principle that alienage is a suspect classification.” 308
Once again, federalism concerns influenced the court’s equal
protection reasoning. 309 Specifically, the court reasoned that the
state regulatory scheme sought “to prohibit some legally admitted
aliens from doing the very thing the federal government indicated
they could do when they came to the United States—work.” 310
Citing Takahashi, the court further reasoned that New York had
not only treated two groups of similarly situated residents
differently, but had effectively “drive[n] from the state
nonimmigrants who have federal permission to enter the United
States to work.” 311
In sum, all of the courts that have evaluated non-immigrants’
right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment have
focused on federalism concerns, but with divergent results. The
Fifth and Sixth Circuits have viewed federal immigration policy
broadly, ascribing to Congress a policy of providing
nonimmigrants with a lesser status with fewer rights than lawful
permanent residents. 312 In contrast, the Second Circuit focused
307. See id. at 70, 74 (finding no “existing basis for distinguishing Graham's
requirement” that state statutes distinguishing on the basis of alienage status
“are strictly scrutinized”).
308. See id. at 74–75 (reasoning “that the Court has never held that lawfully
admitted aliens are outside of Graham's protection” nor “distinguished between
classes of legal resident aliens”).
309. See id. at 77 n.14 (“Certainly the federal government, which bears the
constitutional responsibility of regulating immigration, has much broader
latitude to distinguish among subclasses of aliens. But this latitude does not
give states carte blanche to do the same.”).
310. Id. at 69, 77. The Second Circuit separately concluded that New York’s
law was preempted under the Supremacy Clause, but was “constrained” to
decide the case on equal protection grounds because of the noncitizen plaintiffs’
standing limitations with respect to preemption challenges. Dandamudi, 686
F.3d at 81 (citing the NAFTA Implementation Act).
311. See Dandamudi, 686 F.3d at 81 (‘‘The assertion of an authority to deny
to aliens the opportunity of earning a livelihood when lawfully admitted to the
state would be tantamount to the assertion of the right to deny them entrance
and abode, for in ordinary cases they cannot live where they cannot work.’”
(quoting Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 416 (1948)).
312. See LULAC v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 533 (6th Cir. 2007) (applying
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on a narrower aspect of federal immigration policy—Congress’s
decision to permit nonimmigrants to work in the United States. 313
The courts’ conflicting, perhaps even instrumental, use of
congressional policy choices to justify divergent outcomes
underlines the need for a coherent theory of federalism’s role in
assessing migrants’ equal protection rights.
V. Recalibrating Federalism’s Proper Role in Discerning Migrants’
Equal Protection Rights
A. Federalism’s Place
The respective roles of the federal and state governments in
regulating migrants is a separate constitutional and normative
question from what equality is due migrants once the nation
opens its doors and those with access to the opportunity follow
the rules of entry. In many instances, the courts have conflated
the two 314 and, in the process, undermined the antidiscrimination
norms at the heart of equal protection. One reason for this
development is the lack of a clear conceptual framework for how
federalism considerations may play a legitimate role in
discerning the constitutionality of state law distinguishing
between citizens and lawfully present noncitizens. As a result, in
alienage cases, federalism considerations often have a disruptive
effect on the antidiscrimination norms of the Fourteenth

rational basis where state law was not in conflict with federal law but instead
“mirrored” it); LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 421 (5th Cir. 2005) (rational basis
justified in part by deference to “legislative policy decisions”).
313. Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66, 77 (2012).
314. Judge Clifton, dissenting in Korab v. Fink, criticized the Ninth Circuit
majority for its “confusion as to whether” it was addressing “an equal protection
or a preemption case.” 797 F.3d 572, 605 n.7 (9th Cir. 2014) (Clifton, J.,
dissenting). He noted that the court’s equal protection analysis focused “not [on]
whether Congress may authorize Hawaii to violate the Equal Protection Clause
but rather ‘what constitutes such a violation when Congress has (clearly)
expressed its will regarding a matter relating to aliens.’” Id. (quoting Soskin v.
Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242, 1254 (10th Cir. 2004)). Judge Clifton reasoned that
“no equal protection doctrine . . . turns on whether ‘Congress has (clearly)
expressed its will.’ That is instead the language of preemption analysis.” Id.
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Amendment, transforming equal protection analysis into a
preemption-like inquiry. 315
Federalism’s historic role in equal protection doctrine
involving migrants examined in earlier sections of this Article
helps to identify when federalism concerns can legitimately
matter to the resolution of whether a sovereign has violated equal
protection, and when federalism considerations are misplaced
and work to displace a focus on equality. That analysis and this
Article’s related critique of the recent equal protection
jurisprudence involving lawfully present migrants suggests that
in three categories—which I collectively describe as
interpretative uses of federalism—federalism considerations can
work within equal protection analysis without substituting a
concern about migrants’ rights with an emphasis on
constitutional structure.
First, federalism does not supplant equality norms when
courts consider whether unique powers of the state and federal
governments warrant a presumption that government regulation
in that area is rational and not based upon improper motives. For
example, the Court has modulated its equal protection scrutiny in
cases involving state political functions because of states’ Tenth
Amendment power to regulate elections and define their political
community. 316 Similarly, in Mathews, the Court disclaimed a
meaningful judicial role in checking the political branches’
decisions related to immigration policy on account of the federal
government’s exclusive role in regulating immigration. 317 In both
315. Supra Part IV.
316. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973)
Just as the Framers of the Constitution intended the States to keep
for themselves, as provided in the Tenth Amendment, the power to
regulate elections, each State has the power to prescribe the
qualifications of its officers and the manner in which they shall be
chosen. Such power inheres in the State by virtue of its obligation,
already noted above, “to preserve the basic conception of a political
community.”
(quotations omitted).
317. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81–82 (1976)
Since decisions in these matters may implicate our relations with
foreign powers, and since a wide variety of classifications must be
defined in the light of changing political and economic circumstances,
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instances, this federalism-driven deference is the result of the
same theory: where the Constitution commits exclusive authority
to a particular sovereign, government regulations based upon
that authority, so the theory goes, are unlikely to be based upon
arbitrary and improper motives. 318 Courts implement the theory
by modulating their equal protection scrutiny.
Citing these dual exceptions, commentators have criticized
the Court’s alienage jurisprudence as “incoherent,” 319 but without
explaining why these exceptions are incompatible with one
another or do not employ a consistent and sound theory of
constitutional adjudication. 320 Putting aside whether the
particular decisions in which the Court recognized these
exceptions actually reflect regulation of a type for which the
Court deemed deference warranted—i.e., whether Mathews’
alienage-based restriction on Medicare benefits in fact regulated
immigration 321 or whether states’ exclusion of lawful permanent
residents from jobs as public school teachers and parole officers
really addressed functions essential to a state’s political
community 322—both exceptions reflect a consistent use of
federalism to help illuminate whether dissimilar treatment is
justified. That is, the Court presumes that the government’s
such decisions are frequently of a character more appropriate to
either the Legislature or the Executive than to the Judiciary.
318. See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 295–96 (1978) (describing that the
“practical consequence” of state’s power under the Tenth Amendment to define
their political community is judicial deference to legislative choices based upon
that authority); Mathews, 426 U.S. at 80–82 (describing the need for deference
to decisions made pursuant to federal government’s authority over foreign
affairs and immigration).
319. See Cox, supra note 10, at 352 (arguing that “[c]ourts have struggled for
decades to develop a coherent approach to evaluating alienage rules” and have
“for the most part . . . failed”); Korab v. Fink, 797 F.3d 572, 584 (Bybee, J.,
concurring) (describing alienage jurisprudence as “unsettled” and marked by a
“morass of conflicting approaches”).
320. Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 1026, 1093–94 (2003). Volokh suggests that one or two exceptions to a rule
do not necessarily undermine its “overarching justification,” particularly when a
core principle can still be discerned for the rule and its exceptions. Id.
321. Supra note 96.
322. See Foley, 435 U.S. at 299–300 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (questioning the
exclusion of migrants from many forms of public employment as actually serving
the purpose of preserving states’ political community).
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reason for distinguishing between residents is legitimate because
of the Constitution’s structural commitment of a specific power to
the respective government. And, in both instances, the Court
then uses standards of review as a “legal tool” to help discern
whether the government has complied with the Constitution’s
substantive command of equality. 323
One may legitimately question whether modulating scrutiny
functions accurately as a legal tool or whether courts erroneously
have allowed too many government classifications with nuanced
motivations within the sphere of judicial deference. 324 But those
critiques do not mean that federalism is an improper
consideration in equal protection jurisprudence altogether.
Indeed, federalism’s role in these instances works within equal
protection analysis, not against it, because courts still require
that discriminatory treatment be justified by a sufficient state
interest. Courts’ federalism-tinged scrutiny merely operates as
shortcut to judicial acceptance of a sufficient state interest.
Relatedly, federalism considerations may also play an
appropriate role in equal protection analysis when it helps reveal
that the justification for a government regulation is arbitrary and
improper because the state lacks authority to regulate the subject
matter in the first place. 325 This ultra vires analysis, examined
earlier in this Article, 326 is the inverse of the scrutiny-modulating
deference described above: a government’s lacking authority to
regulate a subject matter is a pretty good indication that its
regulation in that area may be based upon improper motives. 327
323. Neuman, supra note 99, at 1434–35. Gerald Neuman has challenged
the scholarly criticism claiming that because “a classification cannot be suspect
when the states employ it, yet non-suspect when the federal government
employs it,” the equal protection dichotomy is flawed. Id. at 1435. Neuman
counters that “[t]his argument erroneously treats ‘suspectness’ as an objective
description of reality rather than a legal tool.” Id.
324. Criticism discussed supra note 96.
325. See Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 43 (1915) (striking down
alienage-based state labor restriction reasoning that courts must consider
whether “underlying the classification is the authority to deal with that at
which the legislation is aimed”); see also Soucek, supra note 25, at 167–71
(describing a similar role for federalism in equal protection doctrine as “interest
constraining” federalism in comparative analysis of alienage and marriage
equality cases).
326. Supra Part III.A.
327. Id. A variant of this approach was also at work in Gebin v. Mineta, 231
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Like scrutiny-modulated deference, this use of federalism also
serves as an interpretive tool because the focus remains on
whether discriminatory treatment is justified, not the separate
structural concerns of supremacy, institutional competence, and
the respective powers of the federal and state governments.
It remains to be seen, however, the extent to which these
interpretative uses of federalism in equal protection analysis
remain doctrinally coherent in light of the growing influence of
immigration federalism—a normative account of shared federal
and state power to regulate migrants and immigration. 328 For
example, if states do, in fact, possess authority to regulate
migrants in ways traditionally thought to be the exclusive
domain of federal immigration regulation—as many immigration
federalism theorists have contended, 329—the basis for unitary
deference in equal protection doctrine to an exclusively federal
immigration power may need to be rethought. 330
But even in the absence of a reimagined equal protection
framework that better accounts for immigration federalism—a
project beyond this Article’s scope—the consideration of
federalism principles in equal protection cases in the ways
F. Supp. 2d 971 (C.D. Cal. 2002), where the district court refused to apply
rational basis review to a provision of the Aviation and Transportation Security
Act (ATSA), enacted two months after 9/11, that barred all noncitizens from
employment as airport screeners, reasoning that a wholesale ban on noncitizens
from the job of airport screeners “could have no implication in our relations with
foreign powers, nor could it be justified as encouraging aliens to naturalize.” Id.
at 976; see also Kerry Abrams, Immigration Law and the Regulation of
Marriage, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1625, 1645–46 (2007) (discussing Gebin and
concluding that “[t]he reasons behind the plenary power doctrine matter in
determining whether a law falls within it”).
328. Supra note 10.
329. See, e.g., supra note 10 and accompanying text (citing immigration
federalism scholarship); Elias, supra note 10, at 705–06 (“This ‘new immigration
federalism’ is and will be grounded in immigrant-inclusionary rulemaking,
which has the potential to complement (as well as occasionally contradict)
federal efforts at comprehensive immigration reform.”).
330. Clare Huntington, for example, has noted that growing recognition of
“immigration federalism”—that is, acceptance of some measure of shared power
between federal and state governments with respect to the regulation of
migrants—likely means an end to non-congruent equal protection in the
immigration context, but acknowledges that what that means for individual
rights has not yet been explored. See Huntington, supra note 11, at 838 (noting
impact of immigration federalism on equal protection scrutiny requires “greater
debate and exploration”).
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described above, nevertheless, does not undermine constitutional
equality norms. Federalism’s seemingly contradictory role in
these instances—modulating scrutiny of the federal government’s
regulations in one instance and the states’ in the other—merely
recognizes, as Justice Blackmun put it, that “aliens constitute a
unique class”: alienage status is a constitutionally relevant basis
for distinguishing between residents in some instances, and not
others, and often only by a specific sovereign within each
instance. 331
Federalism concerns can also play a more direct role in equal
protection analysis if the Supremacy Clause provides a
compelling justification for states to distinguish between citizens
and noncitizens. That is where Congress directs the states to
implement a uniform federal immigration policy, 332 states might
defend challenges to a state law by claiming that the state’s
conformance with federal law constitutes a compelling state
interest. This approach is preferable to relaxing the strict
scrutiny normally applicable to state alienage restrictions when
states are purportedly following a uniform federal immigration
policy—which is how the decisions upholding state alienage
restrictions after PRWORA have addressed the issue. 333
Requiring the state to meet the demands of strict scrutiny, even if
the Supremacy Clause helps to form a compelling state
interest, 334 is preferable because it will encourage courts to delve
331. Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 22 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
332. See, e.g., Soskin v. Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242, 1255 (10th Cir. 2004)
(reasoning that the “federal government's imprimatur” for state alienage
discrimination may “reduce the level of scrutiny to which the state's choice is
subjected under the Equal Protection Clause” while acknowledging that
Congress in PRWORA did not enact a uniform federal immigration policy and
direct the states to follow it).
333. See generally, e.g., Bruns v. Mayhew, 750 F.3d 61 (2014) (applying
rational basis review because of PRWORA); Korab v. Fink, 748 F.3d 875, 887
(9th Cir. 2014) (applying rational basis review after concluding that Congress
through PRWORA “has (clearly) expressed its will regarding a matter relating
to aliens,” and Hawaii did not violate equal protection by “merely following the
federal direction set forth by Congress” (quoting Soskin, 353 F.3d at 1254)).
334. For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court has viewed a state’s
interest in avoiding conflicts with federal immigration law as a sufficient
justification for alienage-based classifications, but did so while reducing the
scrutiny otherwise required by Graham. In re Adoption of a Child by L. C., 425
A.2d 686, 693 (N.J. 1981) (rejecting equal protection challenge to state law
regulating birth certificates of foreign-born adoptees because “a state may deny
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more scrupulously into the question of whether the federal
“directive” the states purportedly were forced to comply with is
actually a mandate or whether the states instead have
conveniently co-opted federal immigration policy for state
purposes. 335
Beyond its use as an interpretative tool, however, federalism
has played another role in equal protection cases involving
lawfully present migrants. In the new equal protection
jurisprudence embodied by Soskin and the other recent decisions
critiqued in this Article, 336 courts privilege congressional policy as
effectively dispositive of whether states have unconstitutionally
discriminated, even where Congress has not dictated a uniform
rule for states to follow. Here, federalism has a disruptive effect
on equality norms, rendering equal protection analysis more like
preemption doctrine. Federalism’s impact in this final area is
cause for concern, for it could effectively preempt equal protection
for migrants.
B. Federalism’s Disruptive Effect
Federalism has a disruptive effect on equal protection
doctrine when courts treat federal law as diminishing migrants’
claim to equal protection before the states and congressional
policy choices as a basis for viewing state classifications targeting
migrants as laws drawn on the basis of non-invidious
characteristics such as economic savings. 337 Deference to
benefits to aliens if the discrimination [] is rationally related to the state's []
obligation to avoid conflicts with federal law and imposes no burdens on aliens
not anticipated by Congress”).
335. See, e.g., Soskin, 353 F.3d at 1255 (reducing the level of scrutiny
applicable to Colorado alienage-based restriction on public benefits even after
acknowledging that Congress in PRWORA did not enact a uniform federal
immigration policy and direct the states to follow it).
336. Supra Part IV.
337. See Hong Pham v. Starkowski, 16 A.3d 635, 659 (Haw. 2011) (holding
that Connecticut’s denial of healthcare funding to immigrants was at most a
classification “based on an individual’s eligibility for federal Medicaid” matching
funds, and not alienage status); Bruns, 750 F.3d at 69–70 (reasoning that “if
Maine can be said to have discriminated at all” by continuing to participate in
the Federal Medicaid program, “it only did so on the basis of federal Medicaid
eligibility, a benign classification subject to mere rational basis review”
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congressional policy is misplaced and disruptive to equal
protection norms in these instances in at least three ways.
First, treating migrants’ status under federal immigration
law as largely determinant of their claim to equality before the
states sanctions class-based discrimination in matters far
removed from immigration policy, such as fiscally motivated
decisions regarding whether to provide migrants state-funded
benefits 338 or unproven assumptions about migrants’ reliability
and suitability as a class for certain professional licenses. 339 This
expands the sweeping deference afforded to the federal
government’s immigration authority, which is grounded in its
foreign affairs power, to run-of-the-mill domestic policy decisions
that do not warrant similar deference. 340 Even worse, a state’s
actions may receive the same deference as the federal
government where its reasons for singling out migrants may be
the sort of invidious class-based distinctions targeted by
Graham—discredited assumptions about migrants’ inferior
contributions to society and lesser claims to the benefits of
community membership. 341
(quotation omitted)).
338. See Finch v. Commonwealth Health Ins. Connector Auth. (Finch I), 946
N.E.2d 1262, 1275–76 (Mass. 2011) (recognizing that PRWORA’s alienage-based
limitations on federal matching funds for public benefits made similar alienagebased cuts “economically attractive to the State that is left carrying the entire
burden”).
339. See LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 430 (5th Cir. 2005) (Stewart, J.
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (criticizing the majority’s reliance upon
unproven assumption that lawfully present migrants “pose a special threat to
the integrity of the Louisiana bar because they could be unexpectedly deported
or they could leave and go back to their home country, leaving litigants in the
lurch”); Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66, 79 (2d Cir. 2012) (rejecting similar
assumptions about dangers of nonimmigrants’ “transience” with respect to their
suitability as pharmacy professionals).
340. See Neuman, supra note 97, at 1439–40 (arguing that preemption
cannot replace equal protection analysis in cases involving migrants because it
would “permit Congress to decide how broadly aliens should be made vulnerable
to mistreatment by the states [and] extend the extraordinary deference
[afforded] to federal immigration policy to the . . . decisions of states and local
governments”).
341. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) (reasoning that
“the ‘justification of limiting expenses is particularly inappropriate and
unreasonable when the discriminated class consists of aliens’” because
“[a]liens . . . pay taxes, . . . may be called into the armed forces,” and “may live
[and work] within a state for many years, . . . contribut[ing] to the economic
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Second, privileging congressional policy in this way subjects
equal protection rights to the indeterminacy of federal policy
choices 342 when the Constitution intended to remove those
“norms from the realm of ordinary politics.” 343 This is particularly
true in the case of the Fourteenth Amendment, which was
specifically intended as a restraint “on the political majority's
political power.” 344 Additionally, allowing states to immunize
alienage-based classifications by reference to federal immigration
policy sacrifices an important dialogue on migrants’ membership
in state and local communities. Specifically, it insulates the
states from having to respond to what Harold Koh has described
as “the moral and philosophical claims that resident aliens make
against their state governments” through equal protection
challenges, 345 thereby avoiding an important dialogue regarding
what equality for migrants really means and states’ obligations to
their noncitizen residents.
Finally, and perhaps most obviously, federalism’s role in this
category of equal protection cases is clearly inconsistent with
Graham, which did not pin its equal protection holding upon the
federal government’s exclusivity over immigration matters nor
countenance a state’s attempt to frame alienage-based
discrimination as non-invidious fiscal policy. 346 To be sure,
federalism concerns may have played less of a role in Graham’s
equal protection analysis because, unlike in some of the Court’s
other alienage decisions, 347 Graham was also challenged under
growth of the state”).
342. See Neuman, supra note 97, at 1439–40 (rejecting the notion that
Congress should determine the states’ power to subject non-citizens to unequal
treatment).
343. David R. Dow, The Equal Protection Clause and the Legislative
Redistricting Cases—Some Notes Concerning the Standing of White Plaintiffs,
81 MINN. L. REV. 1123, 1134–35 (1997).
344. Id.
345. See Koh, supra note 38, at 99 (arguing that “equal
protection . . . answers” these concerns “in a way that preemption reasoning
does not”); see also Kanstroom, supra note 42, at 461 (stating “counterintuitively
perhaps, the contribution of noncitizens to public discourse and to the polity is
often most effectively accomplished through the legal system”).
346. See Graham, 403 U.S. at 374–75 (rejecting the claim that the desire to
preserve “the fiscal integrity” of state welfare programs may be justified by
“invidious distinctions between classes of its citizens” (citation omitted)).
347. See id. at 371 (discussing Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915), and
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the Supremacy Clause and included a separate holding finding
the state laws preempted. 348 The Court was thus able to separate
its concerns about federal and state relations from its concerns
about equality. 349
But the fact that the Court specifically considered equal
protection to produce a forceful, landmark holding is exactly the
point. During a formative period of equal protection
jurisprudence, the Court unanimously decided to emphasize
migrants’ right to equality under the Constitution, when it could
have simply made the case a preemption decision. 350 This choice
not only had a doctrinal impact on cases involving state alienage
restrictions in that they were decided on the basis of equal
protection in the decade going forward, but it also carried
important expressive significance regarding migrants’ shared
place in the community and status as persons deserving and
entitled to equality. 351
One might respond to the three criticisms noted above and
contend that consideration of congressional intent in the equal
protection context does not necessarily transform judicial review
into a preemption case. 352 That is true to the extent that, as noted
above, courts might treat a mandatory rule of federal
immigration policy that Congress has directed the states to follow
as a sufficient state interest justifying a state’s alienage-based
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948)).
348. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 377–78 (1971) (“State laws
that restrict the eligibility of aliens for welfare benefits merely because of their
alienage conflict with these overriding national policies in an area
constitutionally entrusted to the Federal Government.”).
349. See Bosniak, supra note 96, at 1107 (reasoning that Graham and its
progeny’s equal protection analysis “obviously, depends not on institutional
process concerns—concerns, that is, about who decides—but on substantive
commitments to equality, and on a vision of aliens as the rightful subjects of
equality”).
350. The Court, for example, chose this route in Toll v. Moreno. See 458 U.S.
1, 17 (1982) (applying the Supremacy Clause to invalidate Maryland’s exclusion
of nonimmigrants from in-state tuition program and avoiding a decision on
equal protection grounds).
351. See generally Koh, supra note 38; Bosniak, supra note 96, at 1107.
352. See Korab v. Fink, 797 F.3d 572, 583 n.9 (9th Cir. 2014) (criticizing the
dissent for claiming that the majority’s “reference to Congress’s clearly
expressed will demonstrates our ‘confusion as to whether this an equal
protection or a preemption case’”).

160

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 77 (2016)

classification. 353 But the problem is courts have looked to
congressional policy as dispositive of state’s equal protection
obligations even where Congress has not directed the states to
implement a uniform federal immigration policy. 354 And in these
cases, courts never considered whether following a
non-mandatory federal policy would provide a compelling state
interest to withstand strict scrutiny. Rather, they merely
extended the deference to the federal government’s immigration
laws to the states which opted to follow the federal government’s
lead. 355 In essence, states insulated themselves from the
requirements of equal protection by merely referencing
congressional policy choices as a justification for their own
discriminatory conduct.
This again shifts the focus from the state’s obligations under
the Constitution to the content of congressional policy choices. It
thereby
subjugates
rights
within
an
unarticulated
preemption-like doctrine. For each of these reasons, and to
reaffirm lawfully present migrants’ right to equality under the
Constitution, equal protection jurisprudence in the realm of
migrants’ rights warrants a realignment.
C. Fulfilling Equality’s Promise
To resist what this Article describes as the preempting of
equal protection for migrants requires two rather undramatic
shifts in doctrine. First, courts must recommit to Graham’s core
principles. This should not be difficult given that the reasons for
treating migrants as a discrete and insular minority—their
353. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 n.19 (1982) (recognizing that
though states lack authority to regulate migrants “if the Federal Government
has by uniform rule prescribed what it believes to be appropriate standards for
the treatment of an alien subclass, the States may, of course, follow the federal
direction”).
354. See, e.g., Soskin v. Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242, 1255 (10th Cir. 2004)
(rejecting the view that the “federal government's imprimatur for” state
alienage discrimination “cannot reduce the level of scrutiny to which the state's
choice is subjected under the Equal Protection Clause” while acknowledging
that Congress in PRWORA did not enact a uniform federal immigration policy
and direct the states to follow it); see also supra Part IV (discussing cases
following Soskin’s reasoning).
355. Supra Part IV.

THE PREEMPTING OF EQUAL PROTECTION

161

political vulnerability, similarity to citizens with respect to most
state legislative judgments, and long history on the receiving end
of state-level discrimination 356—have not changed over time. In
fact, lawfully present migrants have only become further
integrated into the economic life of the states and deepened their
community ties since Graham was decided. 357 Lawfully present
migrants thus remain similarly situated to their citizen
counterparts in ways that the Supreme Court deemed
constitutionally significant more than 40 years ago, 358 and which
the Court emphasized in subsequent decisions. 359 Additionally,
while lawfully present migrants’ status as a group that is similar
to citizens for most state legislative purposes has not changed,
their vulnerability due to political powerlessness has only
deepened. This is evident in part from the rash of alienage-based
restrictions on public benefits that many states enacted during

356. Supra Part II.A.
357. See Strength in Diversity: The Economic and Political Power of
Immigrants, Latinos, and Asians, MIGRATION POLICY INST. (2015),
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/strength-diversity-economic-and-pol
itical-power-immigrants-latinos-and-asians (last visited Feb. 7, 2016) (describing
economic contributions of immigrants as a class, and in particular contributions
of immigrant-owned businesses) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); David Dyssegaard Kallick, FISCAL POLICY INSTITUTE, Immigrants and
the
Economy
(2009),
http://www.fiscalpolicy.org/Immigrants
In25MetroAreas_20091130.pdf (describing significant contributions of foreign
born workers, regardless of immigration status, to a wide range of occupations
and labor sectors).
358. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) (citing migrants’
political powerlessness and emphasizing that they share burdens of community
membership similar to citizens); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982)
(citing Graham and noting that “[s]ome classifications are more likely than
others to reflect deep-seated prejudice rather than legislative rationality in
pursuit of some legitimate objective”).
359. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722 (1973) (reasoning that “[r]esident
aliens, like citizens, pay taxes, support the economy, serve in the Armed Forces,
and contribute in myriad other ways to our society,” such that “[i]t is
appropriate that a State bear a heavy burden when it deprives them of
employment opportunities”); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978) (explaining
Graham’s designation of alienage as a suspect classification on grounds of
noncitizen’s political powerlessness); Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 22 (1982)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (suggesting that alienage was recognized as a
suspect status partly to acknowledge that distinctions drawn on the basis of
alienage-status are likely to reflect historic “antipathy” toward this minority
group).
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the economic downturn after the 2008 financial crisis. 360 States
facing daunting fiscal crises 361 reflexively sought to preserve
public resources by terminating coverage for a group that lacked
the ability to respond to such polices through the electoral
process. In short, Graham’s basic rule is just as necessary and
defensible today as it was when the Court unanimously decided
it.
Second, courts must assess federalism’s potentially
disruptive impact on equality analysis and consider federalism
principles only as an interpretative tool in cases involving
migrants. Courts should not be blind to the fact that the federal
power over immigration law and migrants’ exclusion from the
political process may impact the assessment of equal protection
obligations in cases involving this “unique class.” 362 But
federalism should not cast so long a shadow that it transfigures
equality analysis into a supremacy-like doctrine.
This call for a judicial recommitment to Graham devoid of
federalism considerations may invite skepticism, specifically the
charge that Graham’s exceptions have essentially swallowed its
basic rule which cannot be salvaged. 363 But the existence of
justified exceptions do not alone make otherwise defensible and
necessary rules untenable or devoid of what Eugene Volokh has
described as a “powerful attitude-shaping force.” 364 Rather, as
Volokh notes, the force of an original rule is particularly unlikely
to be undone by the presence of exceptions where those
360. See supra Part IV (analyzing the recent decisions challenging
alienage-based restrictions).
361. See Gregory T. W. Rosenberg, Alienating Aliens: Equal Protection
Violations in the Structures of State Public-Benefit Schemes, 16 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 1417, 1417–18 (2014) (citing cases challenging states’ denial of public benefits
“as a way of containing costs in light of budgetary pressures”).
362. See Toll, 458 U.S. at 22 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (explaining that
exceptions to Graham may be “unique . . . because aliens constitute a unique
class”); see also supra Part V.A (describing when federalism considerations
necessarily come into play when assessing state authority in equal protection
cases involving migrants).
363. See Korab v. Fink, 797 F.3d 572, 589 (9th Cir. 2014) (Bybee, J.,
concurring) (“A review of the history of alienage jurisprudence, with a particular
review of Graham . . . suggests that it is time to rethink the doctrine.”); id. at
585 (characterizing Graham as “riddled with exceptions and caveats that make
consistent judicial review of alienage classifications difficult”).
364. Volokh, supra note 320, at 1093.
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exceptions fit “within some exceptional supercategory—for
instance, cases that have been traditionally recognized as being
outside the main principle.” 365 The Mathews and political function
exceptions represent one such instance.
The federal government’s power to regulate immigration and
states’ power to define their political communities are simply
“outside” of Graham’s main principle. That principle—that the
states may not single out migrants for unfair economic burdens
and exclusionary policies—helps ensure that states do not impose
opportunistic policy choices upon this group simply because of
their inability to protest their treatment through the political
process. 366 It also helps smoke out what might otherwise exist as
unspoken assumptions about migrants’ insufficient contributions
to state resources and their lesser claim to community
membership. Thus, the importance of, and justification for, such a
rule is not undermined simply because it may also be true that
the federal government receives great deference in its
immigration policy decisions or that the states may exclude
migrants from political functions and institutions.
Critics might still contend that even if doctrinally consistent,
Mathews and the political function cases punctured such sizeable
holes in Graham’s main theory that its lacks any remaining
significance. That perspective is belied, however, by Graham’s
importance in shaping the daily lives of migrants before the
states in a multitude of substantive and meaningful ways.
Indeed, Graham has a role to play in ensuring lawfully present
migrants’ equal access to employment and professional
opportunities, healthcare benefits, drivers’ licenses, and a sense
of membership and belonging in communities. 367 Deference in
exceptional areas of regulation affecting migrants does not dilute
the significance of affirming lawfully present migrants’ right to
equal treatment as workers, professionals, and people.
365. Id. at 1094 n.207.
366. This principle has an ongoing role to play to ensure that, as Plyler put
it, states are not permitted to “impos[e] special disabilities upon groups
disfavored by virtue of circumstances beyond their control” thereby creating “the
kind of ‘class or caste’ treatment that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed
to abolish.” Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982).
367. See supra Part IV (examining the body of state and federal court
decisions addressing these issues).
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VI. Conclusion

While immigration debates have recently focused
overwhelmingly, and understandably, on unauthorized migration
and the respective roles of the federal and state governments in
crafting and enforcing immigration law, those important
questions should not obscure a critical civil rights question of our
time: how states must treat those migrants who are presented
with the opportunity to abide by the rules of entry and now live
within the United States. For good reason, the United States
Supreme Court recognized decades ago that such migrants
deserve equal treatment. It is now time to ensure that the
federalism considerations that have preoccupied the courts in the
intervening years do not undermine that promise.

